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ARTICLES 
THE FUTURE OF DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA HOME RULE 
Philip G. Schrag* 
For proponents of greater home rule for the District of Columbia, the 
situation has gone from bad to worse. From 1961 to 1978, the District's 
more than 600,000 residents 1 gained both a greater role in national govern-
ance and greater opportunities for self-governance with respect to local mat-
ters. 2 But over the last twelve years, the goal of equal citizenship with other 
Americans has seemingly receded. Congress overturned two laws passed by 
the Council of the District of Columbia, the local legislature. 3 Congress also 
made extensive use of policy riders to District of Columbia appropriations to 
legislate indirectly for the District.4 In addition, the states failed to ratify a 
constitutional amendment proposed in Congress that would have given the 
District voting representation in both Houses of Congress. 5 
This Article begins by briefly reviewing the recent historical development 
of home rule. Next, it explores the ways in which the people of the District 
• Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies, Georgetown 
University Law Center. LL.B., Yale Law School, 1967; A.B., Harvard College, 1964. I am 
grateful for the help of Cameron Baker, my research assistant, in the preparation of this Arti-
cle, and for the comments of Professors Peter Raven-Hansen, David Koplow, Lisa Lerman, 
and Louis Michael Seidman. Research for this Article was supported by a writing grant from 
the Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. As of the most recent count, the District had 622,000 residents. THE WORLD ALMA-
NAC 540 (M. Hoffman ed. 1989). Its population exceeds the populations of Alaska, Vermont, 
and Wyoming. /d. 
2. Obtaining a more significant voice in national affairs and more autonomy in local 
affairs can be perceived as either a single issue or as two related issues. As this Article demon-
strates, either Congress or the people (through a constitutional amendment) could possibly 
address either of these problems without the other. However, home rule advocates tend to see 
the District's lack of voting representation in Congress and its limited home rule as two facets 
of a colonial status that can best be addressed through the single remedy of statehood. See, 
e.g., New Columbia: 51st State of the Union (D.C. Statehood Commission videotape, 1989). 
3. See infra notes 15, 136-37 and accompanying text. 
4. See generally infra Appendix. 
5. Time Runs Out for District of Columbia Proposal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at B13, 
col. 4 [hereinafter Time Runs Out]. 
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might obtain a greater voice in the national legislature and more genuine 
home rule. Finally, it suggests that the District's citizens may have to make 
a political choice, which they have until now avoided, between seeking grad-
ual improvements in their political rights and pressing strongly for 
statehood. 
I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF HOME RULE 
Although the District of Columbia enjoyed a brief period of limited home 
rule for three years after the Civil War, 6 the modem history of home rule 
began only in the 1950's, when large numbers of Americans started to recog-
nize the injustice of completely excluding the District's population from par-
ticipation in all politicallife.7 In 1961, the twenty-third amendment to the 
United States Constitution gave the District's residents the power to partici-
pate in presidential elections.8 In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson reorga-
nized the District's Government and created the District of Columbia 
Council, comprised of appointed members, to legislate for the District.9 
Consequently, Congress ceased to function as the District's Council. In 
1973, the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reor-
ganization Act (Home Rule Act or Act) 10 provided for an elected legislature 
for the District 11 while reserving to Congress several important legislative 
6. From 1871 to 1874, the District had a bicameral legislature. The President of the 
United States appointed members of the upper body, but the District's residents popularly 
elected the lower body. L. SCHMECKEBIER, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: ITS GOVERN-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION 31 (1928). After a scandal in the early 1870's, Congress re-
voked home rule and governed the District directly. S. SMITH, CAPTIVE CAPITAL -
COLONIAL LIFE IN MODERN WASHINGTON 146 (1974). 
7. The best history of the District is found in a two-volume set: C. GREEN, WASHING-
TON, CAPITAL CITY, 1879-1950 (1963); C. GREEN, WASHINGTON, VILLAGE AND CAPITAL, 
1800-1878 (1962). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint 
in such manner as the Congress may direct: 
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number 
of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled 
if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in 
addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the pur-
poses of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a 
State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the 
twelfth article of amendment. 
/d. § I. 
9. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,669, reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE 
ANN. 130 (1981) (Acts Relating to Establishment of District). 
10. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. 175 (1981 & 
Cum. Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Home Rule Act]. 
11. !d. § 401 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-221 (1987)). 
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powers, including the power of final approval over the District's annual 
budget and the power to prevent local legislation from going into effect. 12 
Then, in 1978, Congress sent to the states for ratification a constitutional 
amendment which would have given the District voting representation in 
both houses of Congress. 13 
The District, however, enjoyed only short-lived progress toward self-gov-
ernment. Indeed, 1978 proved to be the high watc;:r mark, to date, for the 
political rights of District residents. The state legislatures did not ratify the 
constitutional amendment within the congressionally specified seven-year 
period. 14 Furthermore, Congress began to disagree with the political judg-
ments of the elected Council and increasingly used its reserved powers to 
regulate the District. For example, in 1981, Congress overturned the Coun-
cil's major reform of the criminal laws defining and punishing sexual of-
fensesY Although this 1981 action involved the rare16 use of Congress' 
expressly reserved power to stop local legislation from becoming effective, 17 
Congress has frequently achieved an equal measure of control over District 
affairs by attaching conditions, colloquially known as "riders," to its annual 
approval of the District's budget. 18 
12. !d. § 602(c) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-233(c) (1987)). 
13. H.R. J. Res. 554, 92 Stat. 3795 (1978), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. 357 (1981). 
14. See Time Runs Out, supra note 5. 
15. H.R. Res. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 22,752-79 (1981) (House of 
Representatives disapproval of the District of Columbia Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1981, 
D.C. Act 4-69). 
16. Although in 1979 Congress overturned a District law that would have prevented for-
eign chanceries from being built in most residential neighborhoods, Congress has used its veto 
power only infrequently. SeeS. Con. Res. 63, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Stat. 1435 (1979); H.R. 
Con. Res. 228, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (vacated by S. Con. Res. 63). Yet the existence of 
that power may routinely exert influence on the legislative decisions of the District's Council. 
For example, in 1989, the District of Columbia Council abandoned a controversial gun control 
bill though the Council had passed it on its first of two readings, after the ranking Republican 
on the House District Committee threatened to offer a resolution to overturn the law if the 
Council passed it. Abramowitz & Pianin, D.C. Shelves Gun Law to Placate Hill, Wash. Post, 
July 12, 1989, at AI, col. 5. 
17. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 602(c) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 1-233(c) (1987)). Congress accomplished this particular exercise of power through a one-
house veto, without presentation to the President, and therefore may have violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine of Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983). In 1984, however, Congress amended the Home Rule Act to make the procedure for 
blocking District legislation consistent with Chadha and at the same time, provided that 
"[a]ny previous Act of the Council of the District of Columbia which has been disapproved by 
the Congress pursuant to [the old provisions of the Home Rule Act] is hereby deemed null and 
void." Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 131(d)-(l), 98 Stat. 1974, 1974-75 (codified 
at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-233(c) (1987)). 
18. See infra Appendix. 
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Since 1975, Congress has used riders to impose more than seventy-five 
types of restrictions on the District. 19 Although riders are usually tied to 
annual appropriations, 2° Congress has often imposed the restrictions in sev-
eral consecutive years. For example, despite the principle of home rule, 
from Fiscal Year (FY) 1975 through 1986, Congress used a budget rider to 
prevent the District from initiating a program to install meters in taxicabs.21 
In FY 1975, Congress used a rider to prohibit the use of the swimming pool 
at Woodrow Wilson High School after 9 p.m.22 In FY 1987, it barred the 
University of the District of Columbia from acquiring the assets of the now 
defunct Antioch School of Law without prior approval of the District's 
Council. 23 From FY 1987 through 1989, Congress required the District to 
establish a free telephone hotline so that people living near Lorton Prison 
could promptly learn about any disturbances at the prison. 24 
Further, Congress has shown particular interest in the regulation of mo-
rality. By legislating for the District, members of Congress can take a highly 
visible stand without actually restricting the activities of any voters in their 
home districts. In particular, they can win the approval of their conservative 
19. A chart describing the principal restrictions and their statutory sources is included as 
an Appendix, infra. 
20. The Continuing Resolution which appropriated funds for Fiscal Year (FY)1985 pro-
vided a new procedural system for congressional review and possible preclusion of District 
legislation and provided that the new system was to be effective "without limitation as to fiscal 
year." Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 131(n), 98 Stat. 1837, 1974-76. 
21. See District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-405, 88 Stat. 822, 
827 (1974) (1975 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-333, 90 Stat. 785, 791 (1975) (1976 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation 
Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-446, 90 Stat. 1490, 1494 (1976) (1977 Appropriation); District of 
Columbia Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 92 Stat. 281, 287 (1977) (1978 Appro-
priation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-373, 92 Stat. 699, 704 
(1978) (1979 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
93, 93 Stat. 713, 717 (1979) (1980 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 
1981, Pub. L. No. 96-530,94 Stat. 3121,3126 (1980) (1981 Appropriation); District of Colum-
bia Appropriation Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-91, 95 Stat. 1173, 1180 (1981)(1982 Appropria-
tion); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-378,96 Stat. 1925, 1931 
(1982) (1983 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
125,97 Stat. 819, 825 (1983) (1984 Appropriation); Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
98 Stat. 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,739 (1984)) 
(1985 Continuing Appropriations) (1985 Appropriation); Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 
99-190,99 Stat. 1185, 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 31,088, 
31,090 (1985) (1986 Continuing Appropriations) (1986 Appropriation). 
22. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 826. 
23. Act of Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-180, 3341-184 (General 
Provisions§ 101(d)) (1987 Appropriation). 
24. 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-183; District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-90, 1329-93 (1987) (1988 Appropriation); District 
of Columbia Appropriations, Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 102 Stat. 2269, 2269-3 (1988) 
(1989 Appropriation). 
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constituents without incurring as much wrath from their liberal constituents 
as they would attract if those constituents were themselves being regulated. 
Beginning in FY 1980, Congress barred the District from using federally 
appropriated funds to perform abortions, with three limited exceptions. 25 In 
1981, Congress prevented the District from decriminalizing consensual, 
adult sodomy.26 In FY 1982, Congress barred the District from advertising 
its lottery anywhere on the public transportation network, including stops 
and stations. 27 
Perhaps the greatest congressional backtracking on the 1973 promise of 
home rule came in a flurry of riders in the fall of 1988. In a single appropria-
tions bill, Congress further restricted the availability of publicly-funded 
abortions in the District;28 barred the District from requiring District em-
ployees to live in the District;29 required the Council to repeal its law which 
prevented health and life insurance companies from requiring Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) testing as a condition of insurance;30 
and required the Council to amend the District of Columbia Human Rights 
Law to permit church-related educational institutions to discriminate 
against people who promote or condone homosexual acts or beliefsY 
25. 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 719 (§ 220); 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3127-28 
(§ 118); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 (§ 118); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 
(§ 118); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 (§ 119); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. 1837 (citing 
H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 118)); 1986 Appro-
priation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 
131 CONG. REC. 34,784, 34,786 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 117); 
1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 117); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 
(§ 117). The exceptions were for abortions to save the mother's life and in cases of promptly 
reported rape and incest. 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 719 (§ 220) (the exceptions remained 
identical in each subsequent appropriation through 1989). In FY 1989, Congress also barred 
the District from using its own tax revenues to perform abortions and eliminated the excep-
tions for rape and incest. 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9. 
26. H.R. Res. 208, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. 22,752 (1981) (one-house veto). 
27. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1175. 
28. 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9; see also supra note 25. 
29. 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-13. 
30. /d. 
31. /d. at 2269-14. Unlike the other riders, which applied only to the year for which 
Congress appropriated funds (and which therefore at least theoretically enabled their oppo-
nents to renew the political battle in Congress the following year), this rider stopped all Dis-
trict expenditures unless the Council amended its law as Congress required, an amendment 
that would have a permanent effect. The peculiar format in which Congress passed this rider 
- a funding cutoff unless the Council amended local law - resulted from the fact that an 
attempt to change the human rights law on the floor of Congress as part of an appropriations 
bill would have been subject to a point of order in either House. However, this very device, 
forcing the Council to pass a law rather than directly legislating for the District, raised consti-
tutional questions, and indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit declared it unconstitutional. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 417 (D.C. Cir. 
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As if to prove that Congress could render the District even less autono-
mous, early in 1989 Congressman Bruce Morrison observed "a minor move-
ment . . . toward greater Congressional control" of District affairs. 32 A 
subsequent wave of drug-related murders led Senator Warren Rudman to 
suggest federalizing the District's police force33 and led President George 
Bush to speculate that he might have to call on troops to keep order. 34 The 
threat to cut back the District's already limited home rule was so effective 
that, in the summer of 1989, members of the District's Council withdrew 
their support from a gun control law opposed by the National Rifle Associa-
tion as a result of "warnings that the bill could needlessly antagonize Con-
gress at a time of fragile support for home rule."35 Later in 1989, President 
Bush showed that he could exceed Congress' regulation of morality for the 
District: When Congress passed the District's FY 1990 appropriation bill 
without repeating the FY 1989 ban on the use of the District's local revenues 
for abortion, he vetoed the bill on that basis. 36 
These are disheartening developments for District residents who have 
voted37 for measures that would lead to statehood, a political status that 
would bring with it the same local autonomy that other states enjoy as well 
as equal participation with other states in national legislative policy. 38 
1989). The Clarke decision is analyzed in Seidman, The Preconditions for Home Rule, 39 
CATH. U.L. REV. 371, 377-403 (1990). In the FY 1990 appropriation bill, Congress directly 
amended the District's human rights law, eliminating the issue on which the court had ruled. 
District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-168, 103 Stat. 1267, 1284 
(1989) (1990 Appropriation); see Abramowitz, House Votes to Limit D.C Law on Gays, Wash. 
Post, Oct. 12, 1989, at B4, col. 4. No point of order was raised because the provision was first 
attached in the Senate, whose Parliamentarian advised members that it was germane to lan-
guage in the House-passed bill providing funds for higher education. See infra notes 126, 137. 
32. May, Rumblings Rise Anew on Status of Capital, N.Y. Times, Jan. II, 1989, at B6, 
col. I. 
33. See Pianin & Sherwood, Local Board of Trade Rebukes D. C on Crime, Wash. Post, 
Mar. 21, 1989, at AI, col. 5; see also Dionne, Crime in Capital Fuels Assault on Home Rule, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1989, at Al2, col. I. 
34. Weinraub, Bush Considers Calling in Guard to Fight Drug Violence in Capital, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at AI, col. 4. 
35. Abramowitz & Pianin, supra note 16. 
36. Abramowitz, Bush Vetoes Funding Bill for District, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1989, at AI, 
col. 6. Senator Gordon Humphrey defended the veto in terms reminiscent of the days before 
limited home rule for the District: "We are in effect the legislature for the District of Colum-
bia." Id. at A6, col. 2. 
37. The District's voters supported statehood by enacting an initiative creating a State-
hood Constitutional Convention to write a state constitution to be presented to Congress as 
part of a statehood petition. Statehood Constitutional Convention Initiative, D.C. CoDE ANN. 
§§ I-III to -118 (1987). See generally P. SCHRAG, BEHIND THE SCENES: THE POLITICS OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1985) (history of the Statehood Constitutional Convention). 
38. States must all be admitted to the Union on an "equal footing"; Congress could not 
give the District statehood without affording it or its citizens the same political rights as those 
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II. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
What is to be done? In 1983, the District applied to Congress for admis-
sion to the Union as a state and has continually pressed its statehood peti-
tion. 39 These efforts have not gone utterly unnoticed: the House District 
Committee favorably reported a statehood admission bill in 1987,40 and the 
National Democratic Party endorsed District of Columbia Statehood in its 
platform of 1988.41 However, the 1987 statehood admission bill was never 
voted on in the House and has never had a hearing in the Senate. Further-
more, while President Bush, to whom Congress would have to present the 
Act of Admission for signature, has expressed considerable interest in state-
hood for Puerto Rico, he has not shown parallel concern for self-determina-
tion in the Nation's Capital.42 
Therefore, to assess whether the District should properly focus all of its 
efforts for increased political liberties on the campaign to pass statehood leg-
islation, one must examine not only the prospects for statehood, but also 
other ways in which the political rights of the District's residents could be 
enhanced.43 This Article considers retrocession of the District to Maryland, 
enjoyed by citizens of other states. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). But see Seidman, 
supra note 31, at 403-09 (arguing that politically and constitutionally, Congress could continue 
to treat the residents of the new District differently, even if statehood were achieved). 
39. W. FAUNTROY, IF You FAVOR FREEDOM, reprinted in D.C. Statehood, Part 1: Hear-
ings and Markups on H.R. 51 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House 
Comm. on the District of Columbia, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 561, 585 (1987) (Mayor of the 
District of Columbia transmitted petition for statehood on September 9, 1983); see also D.C. 
Statehood, Part 1: Hearings and Markups on H.R. 51 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs 
and Health of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 233-52 
(1987) (testimony by Mayor Barry in support of statehood) [hereinafter D.C. Statehood Hear-
ings Part 1]. 
40. The Committee voted six to five, one Democrat joining the Republican minority. 
HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NEW COLUMBIA ADMISSION ACT, H.R. 
REP. No. 305, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1987). 
41. 1988 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., THE 1988 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLAT-
FORM 5 (1988). 
42. See Address of President George Bush to Joint Session of Congress, 135 CoNG. REc. 
H268 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (indicating support for Puerto Rican referendum, which would 
include a statehood option). President Bush recently declared himself "unsympathetic" to 
District of Columbia statehood, but his view seems to be based at least in part on a misunder-
standing. He told reporters that the District "should remain a Federal city" because "its funds 
come almost exclusively from the Federal Government." When the press later pointed out 
that only 14% of the District's budget is a federal subsidy, a White House spokesperson cor-
rected the President's statement, saying that what he meant was that the District's budget 
includes "some" federal money. Devroy & Melton, President Opposes Statehood; D.C. Depen-
dence on U.S. Aid Miscast, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1990, at A1, col. I. 
43. Members of Congress who would not vote for statehood might, nevertheless, support 
other reforms. They may find the present political arrangement unsatisfactory, either because 
they recognize the injustice of not permitting District residents to vote in federal elections or 
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the formation of a new political entity, and the piecemeal accumulation of 
greater political liberty. Then this Article briefly considers statehood itself, 
because although Congress seems unready to support statehood at the pres-
ent time, District residents should nevertheless probably continue to petition 
for it. Increased commitment from the District itself could eventually pro-
duce a change in congressional views on statehood. 
A. Retrocession 
Some suggest44 that retrocession of the District of Columbia to the State 
of Maryland, which, in 1788, ceded the land that is presently the District,45 
would properly dispose of the District. The advocates of retrocession assert 
that Congress could simply give Maryland back either the remainder of the 
District46 or the entire residential portion, leaving as unique federal land the 
Capitol, White House, and Mall area. This proposal recently received unex-
pected political support when the Governor of Maryland said that he 
"would have no trouble with D.C. becoming part of Maryland."47 Three 
because it is embarrassing internationally for American legislators to trumpet the advantages 
of democracy while not permitting those who inhabit our nation's capital to vote. By more 
than a two-thirds vote in each House, Congress did propose a constitutional amendment a 
decade ago that would have given the District voting representation in both Houses of Con-
gress. I D.C. CoDE ANN. 357 (1981). Of course, members of Congress may have voted for 
the amendment cynically, expecting the state legislatures to refuse to ratify it. 
In addition, some members might like to give the District more genuine legislative home 
rule because they would prefer not to have to vote on controversial local legislation for the 
District. If forced by congressional procedures to cast votes on such matters as local abortion 
practices and homosexual rights, the need to placate single-issue voters in their home districts 
may conflict with their better judgment as well as their sense of the propriety of municipal self-
government. While undoubtedly some members of Congress benefit politically in being able to 
express their public morality without affecting their constituents, others might prefer not to 
take stands unnecessarily on highly emotional issues. Delegating more power to a local legisla-
ture would meet their needs, even though they or their constituents would not now support 
statehood. 
44. See, e.g., J. BEST, NATIONAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
77-83 (1984); May, supra note 32. Testifying on D.C. Statehood on behalf of the Department 
of Justice and claiming that the United States Constitution would require the consent of Mary-
land before the District became a state, Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman 
noted that rather than accede to statehood for the District, "Maryland might wish to retain the 
[D]istrict as it is entitled to do under the Constitution, returning to its original borders." D. C. 
Statehood Hearings Part 1, supra note 39, at 341, 343. See also H.R. 4195, JOist Cong., 2d 
Sess, 136 CONG. REC. H646 (1990). 
45. 2 Kilty Laws of Md. ch. 46 (1788), reprinted in I D.C. CODE ANN. 33 (1981). 
46. In 1846, Congress retroceded the land that Virginia ceded to become part of the Dis-
trict of Columbia in the 18th century. See Phiilips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130, 131 (1876). The 
residents of Northern Virginia, who today live on land that once represented part of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, now enjoy the same liberties as citizens of all of the other states. 
47. Baker, Schaefer Invites the District to Reattach Itself to Maryland, Wash. Post, Feb. 
26, 1990, at A6, col. I. 
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weeks later, Representative Ralph Regula introduced a retrocession bill in 
Congress.48 Nevertheless, the prospects for retrocession appear substantially 
smaller than the chance of passing a District of Columbia statehood bill in 
Congress. First, the citizens of the District who have voted to move toward 
statehood49 may not have much interest in retrocession to Maryland, partic-
ularly while any prospect of achieving statehood lingers. 5° Second, the gov-
ernor cannot act unilaterally to enlarge his state; both politically and 
legally51 he would have to obtain an act of the legislature. A recent survey 
of the Maryland House of Delegates and Senate, which asked the views of 
their members on retrocession, posed two questions. First, the survey asked 
whether, assuming Congress offered the District back to Maryland on the 
condition that Maryland assume responsibility for making up the approxi-
mately fourteen percent of the District's budget now provided by federal 
appropriations, 52 they would accept the District on that basis. Second, the 
survey relaxed the assumption about the federal payment and asked the 
same question on the presumption that Congress would continue to provide 
a subsidy (in recognition of protective and other services that the District 
supplied to the federal government) half as large as it now appropriates. 
Forty-seven percent of the members of the House of Delegates and fifty-
one percent of the Senators responded. Of those responding, eighty-two per-
cent of the Delegates and ninety-two percent of the Senators replied that 
they would reject retrocession even if Congress continued to provide a sub-
sidy at half the level that it would appropriate for a federally administered 
48. H.R. 4195, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H646 (1990). 
49. See supra note 37. 
50. Reverend Jesse Jackson responded to the Governor's suggestion by terming it a "Ban-
tustan concept," that is, an enclave in a white state. Schneider & Melton, Jackson Chides 
Schaefer for Offer to Annex District, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1990, at B5, col. 5. 
51. MD. CoNST. art. Ill, § 46 (legislature has power to accept land from the United 
States). The Regula bill would also not make retrocession effective until the Maryland legisla-
tion had voted to accept it. H.R. 4195, § 7, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
52. See OFFICE OF THE BUDGET, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SERVING THE PEOPLE, 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE: .FISCAL YEAR 1991 OPERATING BUDGET A-3 (federal funds 
made up 14% of the District's revenues in FY 1990). The percentage of District revenue 
contributed by the Federal Government has declined steadily in recent years, from 25.2% in 
FY 1981. HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATIONS 
BILL, 1989, H.R. REP. No. 680, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1989). 
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seat of government. 53 Only one Senator and six Delegates out of the ninety-
one legislators who responded were willing to take the District back. 54 
The comments that the legislators wrote on the questionnaire reveal more 
than the raw statistics. The survey provided the respondents with a space in 
which they could write any remarks, but it did not require them to do so. 
One Delegate wrote, "With all the problems associated with the District, I 
would not support any effort to return this territory to Maryland." Another ~ 
said, "I would not want [Maryland] to accept the [District of Columbia] 
under any circumstances." A Republican Delegate said that Maryland was 
"tough enough for Republicans now - this would make political progress 
that much more difficult." Another Delegate explained that "[t]he State of 
Maryland has enough problems without accepting those of D.C." A Senator 
responded that "Maryland has a city with similar problems to [Washington] 
... high crime rates, high property tax rates, poor schools, high rates of drug 
use, high teenage pregnancy, a dwindling population, and [a] decaying man-
ufacturing base. To accept another city with most of these problems would 
greatly strap state resources." Still other legislators responded more point-
edly, such as the one who said, "[t]his sounds like a bad dream" or the 
Senator who sent his "THANKS, BUT NO THANKS! One would hope 
you had more important projects underway." Clearly, the proposal for ret-
rocession to Maryland has little vitality.55 
53. The actual count was as follows: 
House of Delegates 
Number of members 142 
Number responding to survey 67 
Number who would vote: 
a) Yes 6 
b) No 56 
c) Not sure or no answer 5 
Senate 
Number of members 47 
Number responding to survey 24 
Number who would vote: 
a) Yes I 
b) No 22 
c) Not sure or no answer I 
P. Schrag, Survey of the Maryland Legislature (1989) (unpublished survey). 
54. Id. 
55. In addition to possible objections from the District and from the legislature of Mary-
land, the possibility exists that the Governor of Maryland was not entirely serious or that he 
was more interested in blocking statehood than in annexing the District. First, Governor 
Schaefer must have known that the legislature did not favorably view retrocession, even if he 
had not performed a survey similar to the above one. Second, he made the statement not as a 
formal announcement of policy, but as a response to a reporter's question at a news conference 
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B. Other Combinations 
In principle, the District could join a state other than Maryland. Any 
state desiring to annex the District could make an offer to Congress; the 
Constitution does not require contiguity of territory.56 However, the polit-
ical and economic barriers that make retrocession unlikely make annexation 
equally implausible. 
Nonetheless, there are two plausible scenarios in which external incentives 
make union between the District and another state slightly more conceiva-
ble. The first involves Maryland. Imagine that Congress offered Maryland 
retrocession with the understanding that a negative response by Maryland to 
this right of first refusal would lead immediately to statehood for the Dis-
trict. Maryland might dislike statehood even more than it dislikes retroces-
sion because the new state could impose a nonresident income tax on 
Maryland residents who work in Washington. The rate of this taxation, set 
by District legislators, even if no higher than the rate in effect for the Dis-
trict's own residents, could be considerably higher than that which an en-
larged Maryland would impose on itself. Such an offer might cause at least 
the state legislators from the counties nearest to the District to become ar-
dent retrocession advocates. On the other hand, those legislators represent 
only a minority of the residents in the State of Maryland, and they probably 
could not persuade their colleagues to accept retrocession so that the burden 
of supporting the District would fall equally on all the residents of 
Maryland. 57 
The other scenario posits a new state composed of the District and parts 
of two existing states: Montgomery arid Prince George's Counties in Mary-
land, and the northern counties of Virginia. A state consisting of the 
Greater Washington metropolitan area makes sense both sociologically and 
economically. Sociologically, Washington shares more common interests 
with its surrounding suburbs than those suburbs do with the rest of their 
called on another subject. Baker, supra note 47. Finally, a journalist noted that the Governor 
was "twinkling" as he spoke. /d. 
56. The Upper Peninsula of Michigan and most of the Hawaiian Islands are parts of states 
separated from the main contiguous territories of those states by large bodies of water. More 
dramatically, the United States includes the State of Alaska, separated from the lower forty-
eight contiguous states by the land mass of another country, Canada. 
57. This is unlikely but not impossible, in view of the fact that if the new state did impose 
a nonresident income tax, voters from those counties would probably lobby powerfully for a 
credit against this tax on their Maryland income tax. This credit, if allowed by the Maryland 
State legislature, could generate a considerable revenue loss to Maryland. On the other hand, 
the majority could resist the political pressure and deny the credit, subjecting the commuters 
to taxation in two states. 
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states. 58 Economically, the tax base of the new state would be more substan-
tial than that of the present District of Columbia. To create such a state, 
both Maryland and Virginia would have to consent to divestment of those 
metropolitan counties. 59 However, such action by the states is doubtful be-
cause those counties contribute significantly to their states' tax bases. Never-
theless, divestment is not utterly out of the question. Some legislators in 
both states believe that the counties nearest to Washington do not share the 
interests and values common to most other parts of the states. 
C The Piecemeal Approach 
The third approach to greater political liberty envisions the District's 
leadership dividing the attributes of statehood into their component parts 
and seeking reform on a piecemeal basis. In principle, this approach offers 
two advantages. First, the members of Congress, who would have to grant 
each individual reform, may find it politically less threatening or less costly. 
Second, after a series of such reforms, the remaining gap between the polit-
ical status quo and statehood would be reduced and would be easier to bridge 
than it presently appears. Yet this approach is problematic in that each re-
form might further reduce the political pressure on Congress to grant state-
hood, thus making that outcome progressively less likely. 
At this juncture, there are six ways in which the District's residents have 
fewer political rights than their state resident counterparts:60 voting repre-
sentation in Congress, legislative autonomy, budget authority, judicial self-
determination, control over criminal prosecution, and the ability to preserve 
or change the basic political system. Congress can reform most of these. 
1. Voting Representation in Congress 
Since 1970, the District has had a Delegate in the United States House of 
Representatives. 61 Congress permits this Delegate to vote in committees but 
58. For example, the District of Columbia and its Maryland and Virginia suburbs share 
bus and rapid rail systems through a regional transportation agency, coordinate land planning 
through a regional planning agency, and cooperate in other areas of regional concern. Com-
menting on retrocession, the Governor of Maryland noted that "a lot of problems are spilling 
over into Montgomery and Prince George's County" and "there is somewhat of a barrier of 
what we [in Maryland] can do." Baker, supra note 47. 
59. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3 ("no new State shall be formed ... by the Junction of ... 
Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned"). 
60. Of course, United States citizens who reside in American territories and possessions 
have no greater political rights than those presently enjoyed by District residents. 
61. District of Columbia Delegate Act, Pub. L. No. 91-405, 84 Stat. 848 (1970) (codified 
at 2 U.S.C. § 25a (1988) (also codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-401 (1987)). 
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not on the ftoor. 62 The District has no representation at all in the United 
States Senate. 
Having a Delegate in Congress is no small matter. The Delegate presents 
the views of District residents to members of the House. Further, the Dele-
gate can vote in committee and even chair subcommittees,63 and thus may 
engage in logrolling, 64 much as members of Congress do, obtaining advan-
tages for the District in exchange for favorable consideration of bills that 
come through his or her committees. 
Congress, however, restricts considerably the power of the District within 
its chambers by not allowing it a presence in the Senate and by not allowing 
its Delegate to vote on the House floor. Statehood would give the District a 
voting member of the House and two voting Senators. 65 The constitutional 
amendment that failed in 1985 would have accomplished the same result. 66 
However, neither seems politically feasible in the near future. 
Nevertheless, there are several available middle grounds. The District is 
now attempting to achieve some presence in the Senate by electing two "Sen-
ators" and a "Representative" who would appear on Capitol Hill and lobby 
62. !d. See, e.g., Commuter Tax: Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal 
Affairs of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 328-33 (1976) (an 
example of committee service and voting by the District's Delegate in Congress). 
63. Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy of the District currently chairs the Subcommittee on 
Fiscal Affairs and Health of the District of Columbia Committee and the Subcommittee on 
International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs Commitee. 1989-1990 CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 376, 379 (1989). 
64. "Logrolling" refers to a legislator's trading of his or her support on one issue for the 
favorable votes of his or her colleagues on one or more other issues. 
65. Professor Seidman argues that even if the District had voting representation in both 
Houses of Congress, it would have little ability to protect its interests through more effective 
logrolling. Seidman, supra note 31, at 411-12. He points out that the District's delegation 
would be small. !d. at 411. However, several other states have only one member in the House 
and the District would have at least as much power as those states' delegations. Furthermore, 
only occasionally do all of the members of large delegations, such as those of New York and 
California, vote as a bloc to maximize their logrolling power. Second, Seidman argues that 
logrolling engenders negative connotations in American political procedure, thereby making it 
difficult to make explicit, enforceable deals. !d. at 411. But this argument is no more applica-
ble to the District's representatives than to any states' representatives. Finally, Seidman claims 
that the District's voting representatives would indeed have a more difficult time logrolling 
than similarly situated members of Congress from states because groups that lose battles 
within the District will ally themselves with national forces to obtain federal remedial legisla-
tion. !d. at 412. Seidman claims that this allowance will come even at the expense of under-
mining the District's representative's efforts to preserve local autonomy. !d. Divisions within 
the District may "undermine the freedom of the represenatives to effect a logroll." !d. at 411-
12. But while a divided constituency may shake the resolve of any representative, it is unclear 
that logrolling impairs the bargaining power of a representative who has taken the side of the 
prevailing faction within his or her district. 
66. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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for statehood. Tennessee did exactly that while its statehood petition gath-
ered dust in Washington.67 Tennessee's "Senators-elect" became effective 
lobbyists for statehood in the halls ofCongress.68 Similarly, Alaska followed 
this model during its quest for statehood.69 In 1980, the District's voters 
provided for the election of a Representative and two Senators in the~r state-
hood initiative. 7° For nearly a decade, the District's Council amended the 
initiative, postponing those elections several times. 71 
More recently, under pressure from Reverend Jesse Jackson, who revealed 
his interest in running for election as a "Senator" from the District, the 
Council voted to hold the elections in the fall of 1990.72 But in agreeing to 
let the elections go forward, the Council diluted the impact that the would-
be legislators could have. The initiative that the voters passed authorized 
the expenditure of public funds for salaries and office expenses for the new 
legislators, 73 but the Council decided that the "Senators" and "Representa-
tive" would have to "raise private donations to cover their own salaries and 
those of their staffs. "74 Even worse, the would-be legislators elected under 
the initiative as it was passed by the voters would not have taken their seats 
in Congress until admission of the District as a state. 75 As legislators-elect, 
they could legitimately have claimed authority to speak for the District. on 
67. SeeR. CORLEW, TENNESSEE: A SHORT HISTORY 95-104 (1981). 
68. Tennessee's "senators" were elected after Congress refused to consider a bill to admit 
the state. These "senators" lobbied so effectively that Tennessee became a state 65 days after 
the election. V. FISCHER, ALASKA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 152-55 (1975). 
69. ld.; see also W. HUNT, ALASKA, A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 129-30 (1976). 
70. Initiative No. 3 (1980), D.C. Law 3-171, § 4, 27 D.C. Reg. 4732 (1981) (codified as 
amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-113(d) (Supp. 1989)). 
71. The provisions calling for the election of shadow Representatives and Senators were 
amended by D.C. Law 4-138, § 2, 29 D.C. Reg. 2761 (1982) (codified as amended at D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 1-113(d) (Supp. 1989)); D.C. Law 5-105, § 2, 31 D.C. Reg. 3040 (1984) (codi-
fied as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-113(d) (Supp. 1989)); D.C. Law 6-1, § 2, 32 D.C. 
Reg. 1475 (1985) (codified as amended at D.C. CoDE ANN. § l-113(d) (Supp. 1989)); D.C. 
Law 7-2, § 2, 34 D.C. Reg. 2153 (1987) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-113(d) 
(Supp. 1989)); and D.C. Law 7-10, § 2, 34 D.C. Reg. 3286 (1987) (codified as amended at D.C. 
CODE ANN. § l-113(d) (Supp. 1989)). 
72. Bill 8-488, as amended by the Council on Feb. 27, 1990 (adopted by the Council on 
Mar. 27, 1!190); McCall, Statehood Lobbying Advances, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1990, at Bl, col. 
I; McCall, D.C Votes 'Shadow' Lobbyists, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1990, at AI, col. I. 
73. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 1-117 (1987). 
74. McCall (Statehood Lobbying), supra note 72. The elimination of public funding for 
the salaries and office expenses of the "Senators" and "Representative" was confirmed by an 8-
5 vote in which the Council struck this item from the budget that had been recommended by 
the Mayor. Abramowitz, Tax Relief Probable in District, Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1990, at Dl, col. 
6, D4, col. 6. In an age when campaign finance reform consists of attempting to remove the 
influence of private money on legislators, a Jaw that requires a public official to raise his or her 
own salary from private sources seems odd. 
75. D.C. CODE ANN.§ 1-113 (Supp. 1989). 
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any national issue, not only statehood, and they would have enjoyed a cer-
tain degree of prestige associated with their election as proto-legislators. 
The Council amended the initiative to specify the duties of these offi-
cials; 76 by listing only lobbying and reporting duties, the Council appears to 
have rendered them mere statehood lobbyists and may have undermined 
their claim to speak officially on national issues. Further, the sponsor of the 
amendments noted in a memorandum to other members of the Council, that 
the Statehood Admission Act pending in Congress provided for elections of 
federal legislators after statehood was congressionally approved, and that, 
therefore, "[u]nless 'Tennessee Plan' officials are successful candidates for 
office in the elections called for by H.R. 51, they will not actually be seated 
in Congress."77 This approach is more timid than sending to Congress three 
officials who would claim the right to be seated immediately upon the admis-
sion of the District to the Union. 
A more satisfactory partial measure to enhance the presence of the Dis-
trict in Congress would be a federal law giving the District one or two non-
voting Senators, who could voice the District's concerns and participate in 
debate on all issues on the north side of the Capitol. Congress could accom-
plish this by simply enacting legislation, rather than a constitutional 
amendment. 78 
A constitutional amendment providing for voting representation in both 
Houses of Congress, however, would represent a measure far more effective 
than either electing statehood lobbyists or providing non-voting representa-
tion in the Senate. Perhaps the amendment that Congress proposed in 1978 
failed because state legislators believed that the District's population, smaller 
than that of all but three states, did not warrant three federal legislators. If 
so, a new and more palatable constitutional amendment could provide the 
District with one voting member of the House and one voting member of the 
76. Bill 8-488, § 2(b), adding D.C. CODE ANN.§ l-ll3(g). 
77. Memorandum to All Councilmembers from Hilda Howland M. Mason (Feb. 26, 
1990). 
78. The law providing for a non-voting Delegate is an ordinary law, not a provision of the 
Constitution. See 2 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1988). 
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Senate, 79 in recognition of the District's unique status and relatively small 
population. 80 
An entirely different approach to enfranchising District residents in fed-
eral elections would be to permit them to vote for the federal legislators from 
Maryland. Congress could probably accomplish this by an ordinary act. 
Congress has already taken similar action in the Overseas Citizens Voting 
Rights Act of 1975,81 which provides that citizens residing outside the 
United States shall have the right to cast absentee ballots in any federal elec-
tion in the state in which they were last domiciled and could have voted. 82 
District residents resemble American citizens overseas who have lost state 
domiciles. Because the last state in which they could have voted was Mary-
land, Congress could permit them to vote there. 83 Indeed, as Professor 
Raven-Hansen discovered, 84 District residents did vote in Maryland and 
Virginia congressional elections, and those elected represented them in Con-
79. My colleague William Eskridge has noted, in private conversation, that because of 
how the Senate operates, a single Senator has considerably more power than the fraction 1/100 
seems to imply. He points out how effectively Senator Jesse Helms has affected the agenda of 
the Senate and the policies of some executive departments by the skillful use of his power to 
put holds on nominations, to block unanimous consent agreements, to organize filibusters, and 
to make points of order. See W. 0LESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS 183 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing Helms' use of holds on nominations to extract conces-
sions from the State Department); see also id. at 190 (discussing Helms' threat to tie up consid-
eration of Small Business Administration legislation unless the Senate voted on amending the 
Constitution to allow school prayer). 
80. This would change the number of Senators from even to odd. However, such a 
change would be of little significance because all Senators rarely are present to vote and the 
Senate has occasional vacancies, so the total voting on any given occasion is as likely to be odd 
as it is to be even. It might even be desirable to give the Senate an odd number of members to 
reduce the number of important occasions on which it will be necessary to call upon the Vice-
President to break a tie. The fact that the number of Senators plus the Vice-President would 
be even is not problematic because the Vice-President can vote only to break a tie, not to make 
one. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. 
Because an amendment might be a stepping stone to statehood rather than a final resting 
point for the political aspirations of the District, the amendment should provide that both it 
and the twenty-third amendment (providing. electoral votes to District residents) would be-
come void if Congress and the states admitted the District, or its residential portion, to the 
Union as a state. This additional clause would quiet arguments that these amendments pre-
clude Congress from granting statehood to the District. See D. C. Statehood Hearings Part 1, 
supra note 39, at 341-44 (statement of Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1973dd-1 to -6 (1982). 
82. /d. § 1973dd-l. 
83. The Overseas Voting Rights Act is not a perfect precedent because only those who 
moved to the District from Maryland after reaching the age of 18 were eligible to vote in that 
state. But perhaps the historic nexus between Maryland and the District can be substituted 
constitutionally for the nexus between an American living overseas and the state in which he 
or she was last eligible to vote. 
84. Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 12 HARV. J. LEGIS. 167, 174 (1975). 
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gress from 1791, when the cession took effect, until 1800, when Congress 
passed legislation that had the perhaps unintentional effect of eliminating 
their right to vote. 85 What Congress has taken away, Congress can 
restore. 86 
Representative Stan Parris, an outspoken Republican opponent of state-
hood for the District, recently introduced in Congress a bill that would enact 
this approach. His legislation would give the District's Delegate the right to 
vote in Congress until the next congressional election. Thereafter, the legis-
lation would enable District residents to vote in Maryland for federal legisla-
tors and Presidential electors. 87 
85. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103 (1801), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 45 
(1981); see also Raven-Hansen, supra note 84, at 174-76 (discussing at length the statute and its 
history). 
86. Professor Raven-Hansen suggests that District residents may be entitled to vote for 
members of the House and Senate even without further action by Congress, much less a consti-
tutional amendment. He suggests that the word "state" in article I, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion (providing that the House shall be composed of members chosen by the people of the 
several "States") and the seventeenth amendment (providing that there shall be two Senators 
from each "State") should properly be construed to include the District. Raven-Hansen, supra 
note 84, at 179-84. In addition, his analysis supports another argument for re-enfranchisement 
without further legislative action that he does not make. The gist of this second argument is 
that District residents may vote for federal legislators in Maryland elections, just as they did 
from 1791 through 1800, because the 1800 federal statute that has been thought for nearly two 
hundred years to have disenfranchised them did not actually have that purpose or effect. The 
statute continued Maryland and Virginia law as the law of the District until changed by act of 
Congress and thereby gave the District a background of law with respect to which citizens 
could order their affairs. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103 (1801), reprinted in 1 D.C. 
CODE ANN. 45 (1981). In an effort to defeat this bill, its opponents argued that an implicit 
effect of the new law prevents District residents from voting in Maryland elections. Raven-
Hansen, supra note 84, at 174-76. But the text of the bill says nothing at all about the voting 
rights of District residents. Perhaps the majority that passed the bill never accepted the oppo-
nents' parade of horribles, and the history of the last two centuries is based on a mistake that 
could still be rectified by the courts. 
Representative Stan Parris believes that "[n]either Maryland nor the Congress appear to 
have originally intended to deprive the citizens of the District of Columbia of the right of the 
Federal franchise" and that that right "may not have been specifically denied." He notes that 
the issue "might well have been tested in the courts ... but apparently has not been so tested." 
He suggests that "lack of exercise would not constitute a bar to their exercise at the present 
time," and concludes that these rights "may need to be revived by an action of law." Memo-
randum in Support of Legislation to Restore the Rights of Residents of the District of Columbia 
to be Treated as Residents of the State of Maryland for the Purposes of Participation in Federal 
Elections, by Rep. Stan Parris (Mar. 6, 1990). Representative Parris' analysis is consistent 
with Professor Raven-Hansen's history and implies that a test case, initiated by a District of 
Columbia resident, who attempts without success to register to vote for federal officials in 
Maryland, might still succeed. 
87. H.R. 4193, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Initial reactions to the bill were hostile. A 
spokeswoman for the District's Mayor said that it "wouldn't make much sense," the Republi-
can representative whose Maryland district abuts the District said that it was not serious, and 
Rev. Jackson called it "another expression of colonialism." Jenkins, Parris Bill Would Let 
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2. Legislative Autonomy 
The legislative subordination of the District to the will of Congress has 
three different aspects. First, while the 1973 Home Rule Act gives the Dis-
trict its own legislature, 88 it expressly denies the District's Council certain 
legislative powers enjoyed by the people's representatives in every state. 89 
For example, the Act bars the Council from imposing an income tax on 
nonresident commuters who work in the District,90 from reorganizing the 
structure or in any way changing the jurisdiction of the District's courts,91 
or from permitting the erection of buildings or towers higher than the limit 
set by Congress. 92 
Second, except for emergency legislation of short duration, no statute 
passed by the Council may become effective until at least thirty calendar 
days after it is transmitted to Congress. 93 The period is extended to sixty 
days for matters affecting the District's criminal laws. 94 During that period, 
D.C. Vote in Maryland Senate Race, Wash. Post., Mar. 7, 1990, at Dl, col. 2, D2, col. 3. 
Constitutionally, the provision permitting District residents to vote for Maryland legislators 
appears to rest on somewhat stronger footing than the transitional provision temporarily giv-
ing the District its own voting representative in the House, because Eighteenth century prece-
dent exists for District residents voting for Maryland legislators. Article I, section 2 of the 
United States Constitution specifies that a Representative must be an "Inhabitant of that State 
in which he shall have been chosen." Only Professor Raven-Hansen's argument that the word 
"State" in Article I includes the District could justify a federal statute to give an inhabitant of 
the District the right to vote in the House. But, as my editor Michael Fortunato has pointed 
out, if Representative Parris gives the word "State" that meaning, he must acknowledge that 
the District is already constitutionally entitled, without any statute, to a Representative and 
two Senators. 
88. See Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 401, 87 Stat. at 785 (1973) (codified as amended 
at D.C. CODE ANN.§ 1-221 (1987)). This provision was aimed in the direction of fulfilling the 
expectation of James Madison that "a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from 
their own suffrages, will of course be allowed" to District residents. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, 
at 218 (Wills ed. 1987). 
89. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 602(a) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ l-233(a) (1987)) (express denial of certain legislative powers). 
90. Id. § 602(a)(5) (codified as amended at D.C. CoDE ANN.§ l-233(a)(5) (1987)) (bar to 
nonresident income tax). 
91. Id. § 602(a)(4) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-233(a)(4) (1987)) (bar to 
reorganization of courts). Thus, even so minor a measure as increasing the monetary jurisdic-
tion of the small claims branch of the local court from $750 to $2000 required an act of 
Congress rather than an act of the Council. See District of Columbia Retired Judge Service 
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-598, § 4, 98 Stat. 3142, 3143 (1984) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN.§ 11-
1321 (1989)). 
92. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 602(a)(6) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 1-233(a)(6) (1987)) (bar to permitting erection of building exceeding height limit). 
93. The period of "30-calendar-day[s]" excludes Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and days 
in which Congress is not in session because of an adjournment or recess of more than three 
days. Jd. § 602(c)(l) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(l) (1987)). 
94. ld. § 602(c)(2) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(2) (1987)). 
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Congress may repeal the statute by passing a joint resolution, which requires 
Presidential concurrence to become effective. 95 No other city or state is re-
quired to present its local legislation to Congress for approval. Further-
more, for some subjects, important cultural and perhaps constitutional 
norms restrain congressional modification or negation of state legislation. 96 
Congress has gone even further to maintain control over the District's 
local laws in three controversial areas- criminal law, criminal procedure, 
and the treatment of prisoners. Resolutions to repeal any law passed by the 
Council are referred to the District of Columbia Committee in each House 
of Congress. Like many oversight committees in Congress, these commit-
tees, from time to time, sympathize with the concerns of those they over-
see. 97 To prevent committees that are favorable toward home rule from 
bottling up repeal legislation in these three politically sensitive categories for 
longer than the statutory waiting period, Congress has provided that any one 
member of Congress may move to discharge the authorizing committee from 
95. ld. § 602(c)(l) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-233(c)(l) (1987)). The 
President may sign the resolution after the thirty-day period has expired. Id. 
96. Of course, Congress routinely overturns state law related to local legislation. For 
example, using its power over interstate commerce, Congress has barred the states from impos-
ing cigarette labeling laws more stringent than the limitations of federal law. Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (amended by Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970)). But there 
are other subjects, such as the regulation of marriage and the grounds for divorce, that jurists 
and scholars have thought should be reserved for state policymaking. "If the institutional 
interests of state governments in limiting federal intrusion into hitherto local spheres of con-
cern are ordinarily taken into account in congressional actions, then the political process of 
federal legislation may be counted on to incorporate a consistent check against the full use of 
congressional power." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 315 (2d ed. 1988). On 
such matters, the District's Council appears to remain at a disadvantage compared to state 
legislatures because the customary and political constraints against national legislation do not 
appear operative. Furthermore, even in areas that Congress regulates concurrently with the 
states, the fifth amendment bars it from doing so on a state-by-state basis unless Congress can 
articulate a rational basis for the state-by-state distinctions. Congress could not, for example, 
bar stringent cigarette labeling laws in Iowa while permitting them in Kansas. Although the 
issue has never been tested, it seems likely that this "geographic rationality" limitation would 
not apply to the District. Because of the plenary power over the District given to Congress by 
the Constitution, article I, section 2, clause 17, Congress might, for example, repeal a District 
law imposing strict cigarette labeling requirements while permitting the states to impose their 
own restrictions. 
97. From 1973 to 1986, the House District of Columbia Committee received 22 proposed 
resolutions of disapproval and it voted against all but one of them. HousE COMM. ON THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ACTIVITIES AND SUMMARY REPORT, H.R. Doc. NO. 99-1034, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1986). It narrowly (8-6) passed the resolution disapproving the chanceries 
legislation. HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ACTIVITIES AND SUMMARY 
REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 96-1539, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-73 (1980). The Committee has even 
taken t)Je step of approving statehood. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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further consideration of the resolution. 98 The motion is highly privileged, 
and debate on it is limited to one hour, precluding a Senate filibuster. 99 If 
the motion passes, a maximum of ten hours of debate may follow, and a 
motion to limit further debate is not debatable. 100 A motion to recommit 
the resolution to committee is also not in order. 101 In essence, Congress has 
made it easy for a single member to force a vote on the floor to repeal any 
penal statute passed by the District's Council, something a single member 
could not do to advance almost any other category of legislation. 102 
The third type of legislative power that Congress wields over the District 
is an appropriation rider. 103 Congress must deal with District matters at 
least once a year to appropriate the revenues that the District has raised 
through local taxes and fees and to add any federal subsidy. 104 The annual 
review of the District's budget, therefore, has become an occasion on which 
members of Congress can force changes in District practices that Congress 
did not upset through the thirty-day review process under the Home Rule 
Act. 105 Thus, through the appropriation rider, Congress can reach District 
policies that local legislation never embodied, or policies embodied in acts of 
the Council that Congress did not overturn during the thirty-day period pro-
vided by the Home Rule Act. For example, Congress used an appropriation 
rider to force the District to restrict the scope of its human rights law, even 
though the law had been on the books for years and the period for review 
under the Home Rule Act had long since expired. 106 
If Congress wanted to loosen the federal reins on the District without 
granting the District's statehood petition, it could relax these legislative re-
strictions. First, Congress could eliminate or cut back the list of subjects on 
98. See Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 604(e) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ l-207(e) (1987)). 
99. Id 
100. !d. § 604(h) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-207(h) (1987)). 
!Ol. /d. The original statute pertained to concurrent resolutions, but when Congress 
changed the procedure in 1984 to provide for congressional repeal of District laws by joint 
resolution, it specified that the expedited procedures established by the original statute would 
apply to joint resolutions. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 13l(g)-(h), 98 Stat. 
1837, 1975 (codified as amended at D.C. CoDE ANN. § l-207(a)(2) (1987)). 
102. Members of Congress have rarely invoked this power, most notably to stop the Dis-
trict's reform of its sex crimes legislation from going into effect. See H.R. Res. 208, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 22,752-79 (1981). 
103. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
104. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 446 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN.§ 47-304 (1987)). 
105. /d. § 602(c)(l)-(2) (codified at D.C. CoDE ANN. § l-233(c)(l)-(2) (1987)); see also 
supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text (illustrating Congress' use of appropriation riders). 
106. Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 
102 Stat. 2269-14 (1988). The Human Rights Law, D.C. Law 2-38, had entered into force in 
1977. 24 D.C. Reg. 6038 (1977) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1987)). 
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which the Council may not legislate. This action would permit the District 
to impose a nonresident income tax, hardly a radical notion in view of the 
fact that such a tax is common in other parts of the country. 107 The Dis-
trict's imposition of such a tax could raise (in 1989 dollars) an estimated 
$300 million to $706 million, 108 figures which compare favorably with the 
current annual federal subsidy of approximately $430 million. 109 Indeed, in 
view of the federal payment that the District needs to balance its budget, 
some may view the prohibition on a nonresident income tax for the District 
of Columbia as little more than a subsidy for residents of suburban Washing-
ton by the taxpayers of the rest of the nation. 
Congress could also use either of two methods to reduce its own power to 
repeal District legislation where the Council is allowed to act. First, Con-
gress could repeal, in its entirety, the law that requires presentation of Dis-
trict legislation, that postpones the effective date of District legislation, and 
that provides a procedure for congressional review of District legislation. 110 
Short of this, Congress could make congressional repeal of District legisla-
tion more difficult, so that repeal would follow only the most egregious in-
stances of abuse by District legislators. For example, Congress could 
provide that, even for local laws affecting the criminal code or the handling 
of prisoners, it could discharge its District committees from further consid-
eration of repealing resolutions only as a result of the action of a majority of 
the body, as is true for discharges of ordinary legislation. 111 
107. From the District's point of view, substituting a nonresident income tax for the federal 
subsidy would replace an uncertain source of income with one on which the District could 
rely. Furthermore, although Congress could continue to impose legislative conditions on the 
expenditure of the District's locally raised funds, it may be politically more difficult to do so 
than to attach conditions to a federal subsidy. That is, members of Congress may think that 
they can justifiably legislate for the District because they provide the funds for part of its 
budget. 
108. Constitutional and Economic Issues Raised by D. C. Statehood: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 251, 315 (1986) (statements of Andrew F. Brimmer ($300 million) and Lucy J. 
Reuben ($706 million)) [hereinafter Hearings on Constitutional and Economic Issues]. 
109. 1990 Appropriations, supra note 31, 103 Stat. at 1267. 
110. There is a risk that this reform could backfire. The 30-day period may impose some 
political or psychological barriers against congressional repeal of District legislation after that 
time has passed, and elimination of the period could lead some members of Congress to pro-
pose repeal of District legislation through federal statutes, even years after the local laws had 
gone into effect. 
Ill. A majority of all members must sign a discharge petition in the House. W. BROWN, 
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 248, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess., 
Rule XXVII, cl. 4 (1988) [hereinafter HousE RuLES]. In the Senate, discharge requires a 
majority vote of the body and has occurred only 14 times in history. W. OLESZEK, supra note 
79, at 234. There are at least two precedents for applying ordinary discharge rules to resolu-
tions disapproving actions of other bodies: (I) the D.C. Home Rule Act, which only invests 
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Alternatively, Congress could amend the discharge procedure to require a 
petition signed by some intermediate fraction of members, such as one-
third. 112 Congress could also eliminate the time restrictions on debate, mak-
ing it possible for a minority of Senators who cared enough to block a repeal 
r~solution through a filibuster, as a minority can do with respect to most 
other legislation. It could abolish the privilege that attaches to disapproval 
resolutions, making it harder for their proponents to give them precedence 
over other congressional business. Furthermore, Congress could eliminate 
the rule that makes a motion to recommit out of order, enabling members to 
kill a repeal resolution through a relatively technical procedural vote, as they 
can do with other legislative matters. 113 
Legally, neither repeal of the restrictions on District legislative power nor 
elimination of a specified period for congressional review of District laws 
would protect the District's Council from federal second-guessing. Unless 
the District becomes a state, the United States Constitution would continue 
to give Congress the right to exercise plenary legislative authority over the 
District. Accordingly, Congress could overturn any act of the Council at 
any time. Most significantly, Congress could even repeal the Home Rule 
Act. However, that constitutional reserve power has laid dormant in the 
background since Congress passed the Home Rule Act in 1973. In seven-
teen years, Congress apparently has used the reserve power only once. 114 
individual members with the power to discharge committees of disapproval resolutions affect-
ing criminal or prison legislation; and (2) the procedure pursuant to which Congress may 
disapprove pay raises for itself and for senior executives and federal judges. The pay raises 
become effective unless Congress disapproves them by joint resolution within 30 days after the 
President recommends them, and no special discharge provisions make it easy to prevent a 
committee from stalling such a resolution. See Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 
§ 135(e), 99 Stat. 1185, 1322. 
112. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 
§ 21(b)(2)(c)(ii), 94 Stat. 374, 394 (requiring signatures from one-fifth of the members of the 
House of Representatives before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce could be 
discharged of resolutions to disapprove proposed rules promulgated by the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
113. A bill recently introduced by Rep. Ronald V. Dellums would amend the Home Rule 
Act by continuing to require submission of District legislation to Congress, but permitting 
such legislation to take effect on the date of transmittal to the House and Senate, and by 
repealing the special procedures for discharging the District Committees of legislation to re-
peal District Jaws. H.R. 3293, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
114. Apparently, Congress recently used the reserve power to amend the D.C. Code to 
exempt certain universities from the long-standing prohibition against discrimination toward 
homosexuals. See Abramowitz, supra note 31. On that occasion, Congress amended section 1-
2520 of the D.C. Code, enacted in 1977 without congressional objection, to nullify the prohibi-
tion on educational institutions from discriminating based on sexual orientation. Nation's 
Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 101-168, § 141, 103 Stat. 
1267, 1284 (1989) (Armstrong Amendment II). It was noted on the House floor that the 
amendment violated the spirit and principle of home rule, but no member reminded the House 
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Perhaps, having statutorily established particular limits on the legislative 
power of the Council and particular time limits on its power to review Dis-
trict legislation, Congress has persuaded itself that to invoke its constitu-
tional reserve power to prevent the District from legislating on other subjects 
or to repeal District legislation years (as opposed to months) after enactment 
breaks all the rules of the game. 115 Although the home rule compact may 
not create a legally binding obligation, Congress seems reluctant to alter the 
rules it has set down. In the future, the psychological or symbolic power of 
an amended home rule compact may be as great as the power that the 1973 
legislation has exercised in constraining congressional interference in Dis-
trict affairs. Of course there is a political dimension of breaking the compact 
as well. As a New York Times reporter once said: 
[m]ost Congressional Democrats are preparing to resist any attack 
on home rule. For a Democrat to support such an attack would 
entail heavy political risks, since home rule was an achievement of 
the civil rights movement and since limiting it would therefore 
arouse the ire of black politicians, and their heavily Democratic 
constituents, here [in Washington] and elsewhere. 116 
While making it less likely that members will formally overturn District 
legislation, Congress could also act to make it more difficult for federal legis-
that the D.C. Human Rights Law had previously been before Congress for review and that 
Congress had Jet it stand. See 135 CONG. REC. H6543-51 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989). 
One could argue that passage of the original Armstrong Amendment, which conditioned the 
District's annual appropriation on the Council's revision of a local law that had been on the 
books for years, also violated the basic compact of 1973. But passage of the amendment failed 
to amount to an exercise of the reserved constitutional power of Congress because Congress 
used its annual appropriation authority rather than its reserved power to impose this change 
on the District. Indeed, it is precisely because Congress used this indirect method in attempt-
ing to legislate for the District that it opened its action to constitutional challenge. See Clarke 
v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
In 1989, Congress passed a bill prohibiting District of Columbia Superior Court judges from 
incarcerating persons for long periods of time for contempt of court. District of Columbia 
Civil Contempt Imprisonment Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633. The form of 
this action was an amendment to sections 11-741 and 11-944 of the D.C. Code, a Jaw that is 
normally within the legislative authority of the Council. Even so, this was not an instance of 
congressional violation of the home rule compact because those sections of the D.C. Code had 
been written by Congress three years before home rule was implemented. District of Columbia 
Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § ll1, 84 Stat. 481, 487. Moreover, 
Congress had barred the District's Council from amending title 11 of the Code, including the 
sections pertaining to contempt, in the Home Rule Act. See Home Rule Act, supra note 10, 
§ 602(a)(4) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(4) (1987)). 
115. Alternatively, Congress may have refrained, except on one occasion, from repealing 
District legislation more than a specified number of days after passage because it could achieve 
all of its objectives through appropriation riders. On this occasion, a federal court blocked 
enforcement of its rider. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
116. Dionne, supra note 33. 
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lators to attach policy riders to District of Columbia appropriation bills. 
This would constitute an important reform because Congress has only ex-
pressly overturned two District laws since Home Rule began while it has 
attached riders to the District appropriations at least seventy-five times. 117 
Congress presently may attach riders to the District's annual appropria-
tion because House and Senate rules, holding "legislation" in appropriation 
bills to be out of order for consideration by the legislature, 118 can be evaded 
in five ways. 
First, appropriation bills generally originate in the House. 119 If the House 
Appropriations Committee includes in the bill a provision that requires a 
change in District law or policy120 or if a member of the House proposes 
such a provision as a floor amendment, any member can make a point of 
order to challenge the provision as impermissible "legislation." Members of 
Congress may evade the prohibition on legislation, however, because the 
rules against legislating are not self-enforcing: no one, including the House 
leadership, has a duty to make a point of order against a rider, and if no one 
raises the point, Congress can adopt the rider. 
A second, more common, evasion scenario involves the House Rules 
Committee. That body may include in its rule for floor action a waiver of 
points of order. 121 If a rule includes a waiver, no member may properly 
challenge a rider despite its inconsistency with the House rule prohibiting 
legislation in an appropriation bill. 
Third, even if a point of order is permitted, the presiding officer may deny 
the challenge. Because of the vagueness of what constitutes "legislation" 
within the meaning of the House rule, the House leadership can allow a rider 
without admitting that Congress is ignoring its rules for the purpose of im-
posing a politically popular policy change on the District. Despite the ban 
on "legislation," a rider which limits the use of appropriated funds (barring 
them from being spent unless various conditions are met by the agency, here 
the District government) is in order unless the limitation rider "(1) impose[s] 
117. See infra Appendix. 
118. L. SLACK, SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess., Rule XVI, cl. 2 
(1988) [hereinafter SENATE RULES]; HOUSE RULES, supra note 111, Rule XXI, cl. 2. 
119. W. OLESZEK, supra note 79, at 52. 
120. Any provision that directly or indirectly changes "existing law" must be specified in 
the appropriations committee's report on the bill. SENATE RULES, supra note liS, Rule XVI, 
cl. 2; HousE RULES, supra note 111, Rule XXI, cl. 3. However, the various appropriations 
subcommittees are not all equally conscientious in reporting legislative riders, and the full 
appropriations committees do not police their subcommittees in this respect. Telephone inter-
view of Fred Mormon, House Appropriations Committee Staff, (July 26, 1989). Furthermore, 
the rules requiring reporting include no sanctions for non-compliance. 
121. See generally BACH, SPECIAL RULES PROPOSING TO LIMIT FLOOR AMENDMENTS, 
1981-87 (Cong. Research Serv., Apr. 15, 1988). ' 
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additional duties or burdens on executive branch officials; (2) interfere[s] 
with these officials' discretionary authority; or (3) require[s] officials to make 
judgments or determinations not required by existing law." 122 Members al-
most always carefully draft riders so that they constitute "limitations" on 
expenditures of the appropriated funds without running afoul of the three 
exceptions. 123 Clever drafting may enable the presiding officer to accept 
them despite a point of order from an objector. 
The Senate, like the House, technically prohibits legislation in appropria-
tion bills. 124 Nevertheless, if the House has already attached a legislative 
rider to an appropriation bill, the rider is not subject to a point of order in 
the Senate. 125 Furthermore, the Senate may then change the rider in any 
way it desires. 126 
Even if the House has not appended any riders to an appropriation bill, 
the Senate may initiate the process, thus producing the fourth and fifth pos-
sibilities for imposing such provisions. The first of these two procedures for 
insulating Senate-initiated riders from a rules-based challenge is rather ar-
cane. After a challenger raises the point of order that a rider constitutes 
impermissible "legislation," 127 any other Senator may interpose the defense 
that the rider is germane to legislative language in the bill that was transmit-
ted from the House. 128 If the presiding officer rules that the rider meets a 
minimal "threshold" test of germaneness, 129 then he or she calls an immedi-
ate vote of the whole Senate to determine whether the rider is germane. If 
the Senate rules that the rider is "germane," then the ruling automatically 
defeats the point of order that the rider constitutes "legislation" because ger-
mane amendments to House legislation are acceptable on an appropriation 
measure. 130 
This device assists the proponents of riders in two ways. First, because 
the Senate rather than its presiding officer applies the "germaneness" test, 
the Senate is spared the awkwardness of overruling the presiding officer's 
judgment that the rider constitutes impermissible legislation. Second, be-
122. W. OLESZEK, supra note 79, at 54. 
123. Id. at 53. 
124. SENATE RULES, supra note 118, Rule XVI, cl. 2. 
125. F. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 {1981). 
126. A Senate amendment, however, must be germane to the House-passed bill as it stands 
when the amendment is offered. Jd. The theory behind this exception to the Senate rule 
against legislation in an appropriation bill is that the Senate must maintain its ability to perfect 
House-passed language. Id. at 133. 
127. Senate Rule XVI, clause 4, makes legislation in an appropriation bill subject to a point 
of order. SENATE RULES, supra note 118, Rule XVI, cl. 4. 
128. W. OLESZEK, supra note 79, at 54-55. 
129. See infra note 132. 
130. See supra note 126. 
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cause the concept of germaneness is even more ambiguous than the defini-
tion of "legislation," 131 the Senate·also spares itself of any discomfort that it 
might experience in determining that a policy rider, such as an abortion pro-
hibition, is not "legislation." 132 Thus, Senators frequently cast their votes ~n 
"germaneness" based on their views of the merits rather than the procedural 
propriety of the rider. 133 
The fifth device for adopting riders rests upon a possible exception to the 
Senate rule that provides that even non-legislative riders, those that are 
merely "limitations" on the use of-appropriated funds, are improper if they 
"take effect or cease to be effective upon the happening of a contingency."134 
Under this possible exception, 135 a rider is nevertheless in order if use of the 
appropriated funds is contingent upon an act or event that would necessarily 
occur by a date certain within the period covered by the appropriation. This 
131. Although the Senate's definition of"legislation" is unwritten, the Senate "use[s] tests 
for [the definition of legislation] similar to the House's." C. TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRAC-
TicE AND PROCEDURE 991 ( 1989). 
132. A recent precedent has increased slightly the power of the Senate leadership to fend 
off legislative riders. After a Senator who favors a rider. interposes the defense of germaneness 
to avoid a prior point of order, an opponent of the rider may make a second point of order that 
there is no language in the bill as it stands to which the amendment could possibly be germane. 
F. RIDDICK, supra note 125, at 130; see also 125 CONG. REC. 31,892-94 (1979). The presiding 
officer must rule on this point of order, and if he or she sustains it, the Senate can vote on 
germaneness only by overruling the presiding officer. However, a vote to overrule requires 
only a simple majority, enabling politically popular riders to survive this hurdle. 
133. W. OLESZEK, supra note 79, at 55. Senator Brock Adams observed that his colleagues 
"view the rules [against legislation] primarily as a technical obstacle and translate a procedural 
vote into the underlying substantive issue." /d. Where the House has attached no legislative 
restrictions to an appropriation bill, the Senate would find it awkward to overrule the presiding 
officer's "threshold" ruling that a proposed rider was not germane to any House-passed lan-
guage. On the other hand, where the House has attached legislative restrictions to the bill, 
Senators can maintain that even Senate language quite different from House language is never-
theless "germane" to the House-passed bill. 
134. SENATE RULES, supra note 118, Rule XVI, cl. 4; see F. RIDDICK, supra note 125, at 
152. The exception depends upon whether Congress subjects the non-legislative rider to one or 
more events that may or may not take place, such as the enactment of future legislation or the 
occurrence of an irregular natural event. 
135. Technically, this exception is not a "precedent" because it centers on only informal 
advice from the Senate Parliamentarian to sponsors of riders and has never been determined by 
a vote of the Senate itself on a motion to overturn a ruling of its presiding officer. In the case of 
the original Armstrong Amendment, the presiding officer of the Senate ruled that the rider was 
acceptable, and the Senate confirmed the officer's judgment. However, at the request of the 
Majority Leader, the Senate passed a unanimous consent agreement that withdrew the point of 
order, vitiated the presiding officer's ruling, and retracted the Senate's vote. 134 CONG. REc. 
S9124-28 (daily ed. July 8, 1988). As a result, the status of this doctrine is now unclear. 
Precedents in the House of Representatives also forbid riders subject to contingencies (such 
riders are deemed "legislation"), and the House does not appear to have carved out an excep-
tion for contingencies certain to be resolved by a particular date. See HousE RuLES, supra 
note Ill, at 599. 
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exception provided the basis on which the Senate rationalized the propriety 
of the 1988 Armstrong Amendment, which Congress used to cut off all of 
the District's funds unless, by the "date certain" of December 31, 1988, the 
D.C. Council narrowed a provision in the D.C. Human Rights Law to en-
able religious institutions to discriminate against homosexuals. 136 Based on 
advice from the Senate Parliamentarian, the presiding officer overruled a 
point of order against the Armstrong Amendment, basing the ruling on the 
ground that the contingency would definitely be determined within the rele-
vant fiscal year. 137 
Congress could restrict the exceptions to the rules against riders in several 
ways. First, it could simply recognize the District of Columbia as a semi-
sovereign jurisdiction rather than an executive agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment; therefore, the procedures Congress uses for controlling executive 
departments through conditions and limitations on appropriated funds 
should not apply to the District's budget. In other words, Congress could 
allow the District's Council to spend, without federal review, the eighty-six 
percent of the District's budget that the District raises from non-federal rev-
enue sources. 138 Alternatively, Congress could adopt rules flatly prohibiting 
136. Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 
102 Stat. 2269, 2269-7 (1988). 
137. 134 CONG. REC. S9124 (daily ed. July 8, 1988). In 1989, Senator Armstrong again 
offered an amendment to prevent the District from applying its Human Rights Act to discrimi-
nation against homosexuals by Georgetown University and The Catholic University of 
America. Senator Armstrong recast his proposal as an amendment to the D.C. Code rather 
than as a non-legislative limitation on the District's appropriation because the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had declared the 1988 Armstrong 
Amendment to the District's appropriation unconstitutional. Clarke v. United States, 886 
F.2d 404, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In this form, the amendment, which had not been considered 
by the Committee on the District of Columbia, was subject to the possible objection that it was 
legislation in an appropriations bill. While noting this possible objection, Senator Brock Ad-
ams, the floor manager, did not object because "that would leave to [sic] an appeal of the 
ruling of the Chair." 135 CONG. REC. Sl1,107 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989). In fact, the Office of 
the Senate Parliamentarian told Senator Adams' office that the presiding officer would be ad-
vised to rule against the point of order because the Armstrong Amendment was germane to the 
portion of the House-passed bill which provided funding for higher education. Telephone in-
terview with Steve Elmendorf, Office of Senator Brock Adams (Sept. 26, 1989). The House bill 
had no provisions dealing with Georgetown University or The Catholic University of America, 
with homosexuals, or with the D.C. human rights law, but the standards of germaneness ap-
plied in the Senate are considerably less strict than those used in the House. The new Arm-
strong Amendment passed both houses of Congress and became Jaw. Pub. L. No. 101-168, 
§ 141, 103 Stat. 1284 (1990). 
138. The Constitution provides that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. No need exists, 
however, for the 86% of the District's funds raised locally to pass through the Federal 
Treasury. 
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any provisions other than appropriations in District appropriation bills. 139 
At the very least, Congress could cease conditioning the uses to which lo-
cally raised revenues are devoted. 
In another approach, Congress could eliminate or tighten the five proce-
dural exceptions to its rules against legislating in appropriation bills, either 
for District appropriations or for all appropriations. 140 Appropriation com-
mittee chairs could rule rider proposals out of order in committee markups. 
Although the present appropriation committees' rules do not expressly for-
bid legislation in such bills or invite points of order against such legislation, 
appropriation committee chairs could invoke "the rules of the chamber"141 
or, if necessary, move for adoption of new committee rules barring such leg-
islation.142 Congress could also amend committee and floor rules in order to 
make riders, adopted by an appropriations committee, subject to a point of 
order if the committee does not expressly describe and explain the substance 
of the riders in terms of the policy changes in the Committee's report. 143 
139. Under this second option, for example, Congress could elect to appropriate funds or 
not to appropriate funds for health clinics, but it could not provide that no funds could be used 
for abortion. 
140. D.C. home rule advocates may have allies. Since the 1977 Hyde Amendment debate 
restricting nationally federal funding for abortions others have urged tighter procedural con-
trol on legislation in the guise of appropriations, defeating review by the substantive commit-
tees which have oversight responsibilities over the agencies to which the appropriations are 
directed. SeeS. Res. 2, §§ 13, 16, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 6-7 (1985); S. Res. 
24, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 329 (1985); S. Res. 32, § 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 
131 CONG. REC. 334 (1985); H.R. Res. 5, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 34 (1983); 
DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, SPECIAL REPORT: THE APPROPRIATION RIDER CONTRO-
VERSY (Feb. 14, 1978). 
141. Telephone interview with Charles Tiefer, Deputy Counsel to the Clerk of the House 
(July 13, 1989). 
142. Senator Robert Byrd, who became chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee in 
1989, seems less likely than his predecessors to tolerate riders. He has demonstrated his hostil-
ity to them over a period of years. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc. S9!25 (daily ed. July 8, 1988) 
(Senator Byrd expressing disagreement with the ruling of the presiding officer that the Arm-
strong Amendment was not impermissible legislation); 125 CONG. REC. 31,892-94 (1979). In 
the long run, however, new rules or precedents are necessary for the appropriations commit-
tees and for the floors of both Houses of Congress. The House has a precedent for barring its 
Appropriations Committee from including in appropriation bills any matter that would en-
croach on the policy prerogatives of a particular substantive committee. Since 1983, a House 
rule has barred the Appropriations Committee, and all other committees except the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, from reporting tax or tariff proposals. Tax or tariff riders in reported 
appropriation bills are subject to points of order. W. OLESZEK, supra note 79, at 55. 
143. See supra note 142. In addition, the House of Representatives could build upon a 
reform it initiated in 1983. Under current House rules, as amended, before any appropriation 
riders, other than those recommended by the Appropriations Committee or those relating 
solely to dollar amounts, can be considered on the House floor, the floor manager may move 
that the Committee of the Whole (the full House sitting as the body which initially considers 
legislation) rise and report to the House. If carried, this motion preempts further amendments. 
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Second, the Chair of the House District of Columbia Committee could 
assume responsibility for making a point of order against every legislative 
rider, whether originating in the Appropriations Committee or on the floor, 
to a District of Columbia appropriation, unless barred by a rule waiving 
points of order. Moreover, the House Rules Committee could adopt an in-
ternal rule or a practice of never waiving points of order against riders to 
District of Columbia appropriations. 
Third, points of order will not necessarily block impermissible riders and 
could be overruled by the presiding officer or the chamber itself. Therefore, 
Congress could adopt written, less ambiguous rules governing which appro-
priation riders are impermissible and which are valid "limitations" on the 
appropriations being made. For example, the Senate could adopt a more 
restrictive test of when an appropriation rider was germane to House-passed 
language. The Senate could also tighten its rule against amendments condi-
tioning funds on contingencies by not excepting those contingencies which 
will occur by a date certain. If Congress will not bar riders to District of 
Columbia appropriation bills as a class, it should at least distinguish between 
amendments which merely reduce the amount of funds available, such as 
across the board percentage cuts, and those which attempt to impose legisla-
tive policy on the District, such as prohibiting the use of funds for abor-
tions. 144 At a bare minimum, the Senate could instruct its Parliamentarian 
to adopt a stance regarding germaneness more akin to that applied in the 
House, 145 so that, for example, a provision in a House bill providing funds 
See 129 CONG. REC. H35-51 (1983). This procedure has significantly reduced the number of 
riders approved by the House. Telephone interview with Stanley Bach, Congressional Re-
search Service (June 22, 1989). Congress could strengthen this procedure, however, by impos-
ing the duty, rather than the option, on floor managers to move to rise or alternatively by 
providing that the chair of the relevant authorizing committee, such as the District of Colum-
bia Committee, can make the motion. 
144. This may indeed be the purpose of the existing distinction between impermissible "leg-
islation" and permissible "limitations," but the distinction is rooted in case-by-case congres-
sional precedents that are difficult to apply to new situations. The distinction has not worked 
in practice to prevent federal second-guessing of local policy decisions. 
145. See, e.g., 135 CoNG. REc. H6939 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1989) (a successful point of order 
raised on grounds of germaneness by the District's House Delegate against a rider that would 
have limited the degree to which the District could have given preference to its own residents 
on civil service employment). The Senate's less restrictive attitude toward germaneness affects 
House procedure as well because riders that could not originate in the House may be tacked on 
to appropriations in the Senate and then returned to the House as a result of Senate-House 
conferences. At that point, the House can disagree with the conference recommendation, but a 
conference recommendation can not be ruled out of order in the House on gro~nds of ger-
maneness. HousE RULES, supra note 111, Rule XXVIII. One member of the House noted: 
If we are going to go through this practice of trying to ram through Senate amend-
ments which would never be permissible here as amendments to an appropriation bill 
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generally for higher education would not be a sufficient predicate for a Sen-
ate amendment repealing human rights protections for college students. 146 
Fourth, the Senate could modify its practice of mooting points of order 
against riders through supervening challenges to their "germaneness." The 
Senate could provide that any claim that a rider, though legislative, is ger-
mane must be resolved by a ruling of the presiding officer, with a possible 
appeal to the body, rather than by a dispositive vote on whether the proposal 
is germane. This procedure could help to focus the Senate on the technical 
issue rather than the merits of the rider, thereby buttressing the procedural 
integrity of the Senate's action. 147 
Finally, appropriation riders adopted by the Senate but not by the House 
must eventually be brought back to the House floor. There, any member can 
insist that the House vote on the appropriations separately rather than as 
submerged in an overall vote on a conference report. 148 The Chair of the 
House District of Columbia Committee should insist on such a vote for 
every District of Columbia appropriation rider added by the Senate and ac-
cepted by the House conferees. Although the House might accept some of 
the Senate amendments, others would probably be defeated, and the House 
conferees would soon show greater resistance to the legislative riders pro-
posed by their Senate colleagues. 
3. Budget Authority 
With respect to ordinary legislation, the District must wait for congres-
sional review and, perhaps, the repeal that might follow. Congressional re-
view, however, does not actually affect the overwhelming majority of 
District laws. On the other hand, the District's annual appropriation must 
endure a searching review by the appropriations committees on Capitol Hill, 
and it cannot become law without being affirmatively enacted by Con-
gress. 149 As a result, even the eighty-six percent of the District's budget that 
the District raises through the imposition of local taxes and fees may not be 
spent without a federal review of the allocation of the funds. For purposes of 
budget approval, Congress treats the District as though it were a federal 
agency rather than a local government. 
because of our rule against legislating on an appropriation bill, we are simply giving 
the other body a tremendous whip hand over us in the legislative process. 
135 CONG. REC. H6543 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Green). 
146. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text. 
148. HousE RULES, supra note 111, Rule XX. 
149. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 446 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN.§ 47-304 (1987)). 
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The most obvious step that Congress could take in the direction of greater 
local autonomy would be to allow the District's Council to appropriate the 
funds the District itself raises as the Council deems fit. Alternatively, Con-
gress could treat the budget like other District bills, requiring the District to 
submit budget legislation to Congress for its information, review, and possi-
ble revision by affirmative legislation, but providing that budgets approved 
by the District's Council would become law if not overturned by an Act of 
Congress. 
Unfortunately, the District's dependence on Congress to appropriate four-
teen percent of the District's budget from the United States Treasury could 
render such a reform meaningless. The District's annual plea and need for a 
federal subsidy could prompt language in the subsidy legislation condition-
ing the federal payment in various ways, reallocating the part of the budget 
derived from local revenues, and even barring the District from spending its 
own funds for purposes disapproved by Congress. 150 
A bill recently introduced by Representative Dellums might reduce the 
risk of congressional alteration of the District's budget. 151 Under this bill, 
the federal subsidy payment would be authorized on a permanent basis pur-
suant to a statutory formula, and the District's Council, rather than Con-
gress, would approve the budget. 15~ Congress' subsidy appropriation would 
represent its only annual involvement in the budget process. With the line-
item appropriations of the budget no longer before them, perhaps the appro-
priations committees would focus only on the District's needs and on 
whether the amount determined by the authorization formula had been cor-
rectly computed. Moreover, Congress would be less inclined to change the 
allocations of funds within the budget or to attach policy riders. If Congress 
continues to undertake policymaking for the District as part of its review of 
the federal payment, then perhaps the District should consider foregoing the 
federal payment and becoming economically independent of Congress, a task 
that would become much easier if Congress would eliminate the bar to impo-
sition of a nonresident income tax. 153 
150. See, e.g., 1989 Appropriation, supra note 24, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (providing that no 
funds, even those raised locally, could be used to perform abortions, except where the mother's 
life was endangered). 
151. H.R. 3293, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess. 1 § 2(b) (1990). Under this bill, Congress would 
perpetually authorize a federal payment amounting to 21% of the total tax revenue of the 
general fund of the District. 
152. Id. 
153. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text; see also H.R. 11303, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 1 (a bill to eliminate this bar failed on an 8-12 vote in the House District of Columbia 
Committee in 1978). See generally Commuter Tax: Hearings and Markups on H.R. 11303 and 
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The Dellums bill would only make the authorization of appropriations 
permanent; Congress would still have to appropriate the federal payment 
annually. A former minority staff director has criticized the bill on that 
ground. 154 Even if the Dellums bill passed, the House and Senate appropria-
tions committees would have an annual occasion to legislate for the District, 
and they might be tempted to make use of it. Alternatively, Congress, in a 
single law, could authorize and appropriate for every future year a sum of 
money for the use of the District of Columbia, based on a percentage of 
locally raised revenues. A future Congress could repeal that law, reverting 
to annual appropriations, but if it did not do so, the appropriations commit-
tees would have no annual occasion on which to consider the District's 
morals legislation or any other District policy. While a nonconstitutional 
provision bars a bill to establish a permanent indefinite appropriation for the 
District, it could incur opposition from members of the appropriations com-
mittees because it would reduce their discretion. 155 
4. Judicial Self-Determination 
An important characteristic distinguishing self-determining communities 
from those held in colonial rule is that the colonial ruler rather than the 
people in those territories usually selects the judges in colonially-governed 
territories. In this respect, the District more closely resembles a colony than 
a state. The people do not elect the judges, and the Mayor does not appoint 
them. Rather, the President of the United States nominates the judges and 
the United States Senate confirms them. 156 The President must select nomi-
nees from among three names proposed by a seven-member commission, of 
which only three members are selected by District government officials. 157 
Federal law, rather than local law, determines the judicial term of office. 158 
Here too, some changes short of statehood could give the District greater 
autonomy. The one change most respectful of the principles of home rule 
would be to allow the District to select its judges through a method deter-
H.R. 10116 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal and Gov't Affairs of the House Comm. on the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). 
154. King, Here's What to Do About Home Rule- Now, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1990 at B7, 
col. 6. 
155. Telephone interview with Tim Leath, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, Mar. 
14, 1990. 
156. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 433, reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. 10 (Supp. 
1989). 
157. The President appoints one member ofthe commission, the Board of Governors of the 
D.C. Bar appoint two members, the Mayor of the District appoints two members, the Council 
appoints one member, and the chief judge of the federal district court appoints one member (a 
federal judge). !d. § 434, reprinted in I D.C. CoDE ANN. 11. 
158. Id. §§ 431, 432, reprinted in I D.C. CODE ANN. 8-10. 
1990] District of Columbia Home Rule 343 
mined by the District's Council and to determine the judges' terms of office. 
Alternatively, Congress might choose a method through which the people of 
the District could select their judges. For example, Congress could substi-
tute the Mayor for the President or the Council for the Senate in an appoint-
ment process. 159 At the very least, if Congress wants the judiciary selected 
through very indirect methods, it could reconstitute the selection commis-
sion to include only persons chosen, directly or indirectly, by the voters of 
the District. 160 
5. Control Over Criminal Prosecution 
Except in the nation's capital, every state and city selects the officials who 
will prosecute local crimes. 161 In the District, however, the United States 
Attorney, rather than an official chosen by the District's officials or voters, 
prosecutes all crimes other than violations of minor regulations. 162 This ar-
rangement not only symbolically insults the District, but it diffuses responsi-
bility, allowing members of Congress to blame the District's local 
government for insufficient crime control while refusing to allow officials 
159. Given the opportunity, the people of the District would probably retain an appoint-
ment process for judicial selection rather than change to direct election of judges. In the Dis-
trict's Statehood Constitutional Convention in 1982, little sentiment existed for electing judges, 
although a vigorous battle took place over whether appointed judges should be subject to pop-
ular votes in retention elections. See P. SCHRAG, supra note 37, at 204-07. 
160. For example, some members might be choosen by the Mayor, some by the Chair of 
the Council, some by the full Council, and some by sitting District of Columbia judges. There 
seems to be little justification for giving a voice in selection of local judges to the chief judge of 
the federal system while excluding the chief judge of the system in which the local judge will 
serve. 
161. "Local crimes" means offenses defined by the Council. There is nothing unusual, of 
course, in having United States Attorneys selected by the President prosecute crimes defined 
by Congress. 
162. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-101 (1989). Congress has forbidden the District's Council 
from enacting any "act ... relating to ... the duties or powers of the United States attorney." 
Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 602(a)(8) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § l-
233(a)(8) (1987)). It is not clear whether that provision of law literally prevents the Council 
from amending section 23-101 to give its attorney, the Corporation Counsel for the District of 
Columbia, concurrent authority to prosecute crimes. Perhaps such a grant of power to an 
official of the District would not even "relate to" (much less diminish) the powers of the 
United States Attorney who would, in principle, gain a cooperative colleague and not lose any 
authority. However, such a move by the District would give the appearance on Capitol Hill of 
a grab for power with potential for creating rivalries between the two prosecuting authorities. 
In this respect, it should be noted that any amendments by the Council to title 23 of the D.C. 
Code are given special scrutiny by Congress; Congress prevents the amendments from going 
into force pending a 60-day congressional review (compared with 30 days for other types of 
legislation). If reforms are made in this area, they almost certainly will have to come from 
Congress, not from the Council. 
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chosen by the District to decide which crimes to prosecute, what plea bar-
gains to accept, and what sentences or sentencing alternatives to seek. 
Ideally, Congress should transfer to the District the power to prosecute all 
local crimes, retaining for the Federal Goyernment, of course, the power to 
prosecute violations of federal criminal statutes. Alternatively, Congress 
could authorize District officials to prosecute certain types of serious crimes, 
while reserving to the United States Attorney the authority to prosecute the 
most serious crimes. 
6. The Evanescent Nature of Home Rule 
A final respect in which the District's residents have fewer political rights 
than residents of states lies in the fact that, while Congress cannot revoke a 
state's admission to the Union or prevent a state from having the same polit-
ical rights as all other states, 163 it can rescind even the limited autonomy 
that it has granted to the District. 164 Furthermore, the Home Rule Act rests 
upon such a frail political charter that Congress can undercut its limited 
grant of autonomy without paying the political price associated with its re-
peal or amendment. It can simply violate the Home Rule Act on an ad hoc 
basis. 
For example, the Home Rule Act provides that Congress may repeal a 
statute passed by the Council within the thirty-day waiting period before the 
law becomes effective. 165 If Congress waited until the thirty-first day before 
repealing a law of the District, the repeal would still be effective. Some polit-
ical fallout may result from this maneuver because the Home Rule Act has 
created expectations that Congress will not meddle with local laws after the 
thirty-day period has expired. However, no legal obstacle would bar this 
repeal because Congress has constitutional power to legislate for the District, 
and because no Congress has the power to bind its successors. 166 The ex-
isting political expectations that would be challenged are held primarily by 
District residents, and they have no voting representatives in Congress. In-
163. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (Congress lacked the power to impose 
restrictions in Oklahoma's enabling statute that would deprive Oklahoma of its power to locate 
its own seat of government and thus render it unequal to other states). 
164. The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall "exercise exclusive Legis-
lation in all Cases whatsoever" over the District. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In the exer-
cise of this power, Congress has delegated some of its lawmaking authority to the District 
government. But nothing in the Constitution, except Article IV, which permits Congress to 
establish states, authorizes Congress to divest itself of its constitutional power. 
165. Home Rule Act, supra note 10, § 60l(c)(l) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ l-233(c)(l) (1987)); see also supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
166. For a delightful and exhaustive analysis ofthe legal and philosophical justifications for 
the prohibition on self-entrenching legislation, see Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative 
Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379. 
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deed, the frequency with which Congress does pass legislation for the Dis-
trict in the guise of appropriation riders reveals the insignificance of the 
political cost of breaking the home rule compact. 
D. Statehood 
Compared with retrocession, combinations with other jurisdictions, and 
the piecemeal approach, statehood obviously presents an attractive option. 
Not only would it provide the residents of the District with political rights 
fully equal to those of the residents of existing states, but the conferral of 
those rights would be permanent rather than subject to reversal when the 
political coalition that had produced reform began to dissolve. 
Achieving statehood, however, seems much more difficult than obtaining 
incremental reform over a long period of time. A statehood vote would re-
quire legislators to offer District residents considerably more power immedi-
ately. Statehood, therefore, attracts simultaneous opposition from: all those 
who object to the likelihood of two more Democrats in the Senate; those 
who do not want their own states' influence in the National Legislature di-
luted even by two percent; those in Maryland and Virginia who want to 
avoid the possibility of a commuter tax on their incomes; those who think 
that the security of federal buildings would somehow be compromised if 
Congress gave up its right to re-nationalize the District's police force; those 
who believe that some basic principle makes the concept of a city-state un-
thinkable; those who think the District too "liberal;" 167 those District resi-
dents who believe that their taxes would go up more quickly if Congress no 
longer had to approve the District's budget; and those, if any, who would 
prefer not to live in a country that includes a state with a black governor, a 
majority- black state legislature, and in all possibility, two black United 
States Senators. 168 
167. "What have we gotten by enacting home rule? ... Let's either revoke or drastically 
restructure home rule - let's finally help the unfortunate residents of this festering liberal 
hellhole." 135 CONG. REc. H4918 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. DeLay). See 
also Ayres, Washington Council Backs Vote on Congress Delegation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 
1990, at A20, col. 3 ("In the past, some of the most adamant opposition to statehood has come 
from conservatives in Congress. Those lawmakers have argued that the predominately Demo-
cratic city would send only liberals to Congress."). Ed Rollins, a strategist for the Republican 
Party, has noted that "[g]enerally, Republicans do not favor statehood [because] you're going 
to get two liberal Democrats [in the Senate] and keep getting them for the next 100 years." 
Devroy & Melton, supra note 42. 
168. Senator Edward M. Kennedy has been quoted by his colleague Senator Orrin G. 
Hatch as saying that opposition to the failed constitutional amendment to give the District 
voting representation in Congress was based on antipathy to a constituency that was "too 
liberal, too urban, too black, and too Democratic," and that the arguments against the amend-
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The fact that opponents of greater home rule can make three constitu-
tional arguments against statehood that they could not make against incre-
mentally-achieved greater home rule further diminishes the likelihood of 
achieving statehood. These arguments, however dubious, have drawn atten-
tion away from the merits of equal political rights for District residents and 
thereby obscured the issues. 
The first of these arguments centers upon the language of article I, section 
8, clause 17, of the Constitution. Some argue that when the framers of the 
Constitution permitted Congress to "exercise exclusive Legislation ... over 
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particu-
lar States ... become the Seat of the Government," 169 they intended to make 
any such ceded land a permanent capital and to prevent Congress from 
granting statehood to any part of it. 170 Testifying against statehood on be-
half of the United States Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen J. Markman claimed that "[o]nce the District became the seat of 
government in the manner prescribed in this provision, Congress cannot by 
simple legislation permanently abrogate its constitutional power to exercise 
exclusive legislation [over it]." 171 
Markman's argument, however, is vulnerable in two respects. First, the 
power to exercise "exclusive" legislation over a territory obviously includes 
the power to delegate legislative authority, as in the Home Rule Act, and, 
almost though perhaps not quite as obviously, the power to make such a 
delegation permanent. 172 Second, Congress has already divested the Federal 
ment were "a cover for partisan politics or ... racism." Hatch, Foreword to J. BEST, supra 
note 44, at vii-viii. 
Until recently, an additional political obstacle to statehood was the persistent rumor that the 
District's Mayor, Marion S. Barry, Jr., used cocaine. A number of members of Congress were 
leery of appearing to be ready to vest additional power in a local government whose political 
leader might be a drug addict and whose administration had been marked by scandals. Some 
observers suggested that the arrest of the Mayor on drug charges on January 18, 1990, "would 
set back the already struggling campaign seeking statehood." Apple, In Need of Minor Mira-
cle, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1990, at 1, col. 1, at 11, col. 4. But the arrest and subsequent indict-
ment of the Mayor, if they ultimately lead to his removal from office, could actually advance 
the cause of statehood by making it possible for members of Congress to support statehood 
without appearing to endorse Mayor Barry. 
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
170. No statehood proposal purports to eliminate a District of Columbia over which Con-
gress would retain exclusive and plenary power. The statehood bill, on which the House Dis-
trict of Columbia Committee in 1987 reported, would only have shrunk the size of the District 
of Columbia to the principal governmental area, creating a state out of the residential portions. 
Article I of the Constitution sets a maximum area for the District, but it does not require the 
District to be as large as ten square miles. 
171. D. C Statehood Hearings, Part 1, supra note 39, at 342. 
172. See id. at 384 (prepared statement of Prof. Jason I. Newman of Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center). The reason that the second claim is not as obvious as the first is that Con-
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Government of part of the territory of the District. In 1846, finding that "no 
more territory ought to be held under the exclusive legislation given to Con-
gress over the District . . . than may be necessary and proper for the pur-
poses of such a seat," Congress retroceded about a third of what had been 
the District of Columbia to Virginia. 173 This land became Arlington and 
part of Alexandria, Virginia. Under the Justice Department's theory, Con-
gress must have unconstitutionally retroceded those portions of Virginia, 
which are therefore still part of the District. Confronted with this objection, 
Markman could say only that "[t]hat is a very good question, Congressman, 
and it is one of the more difficult questions that needs to be dealt with." 174 
The second constitutional argument against statehood rests upon the 
claim that even if Congress can divest itself of part of the District, it cannot 
do so without the consent of Maryland. The Constitution states that "no 
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other 
State ... without the Consent" of the legislature of that state. 175 Objectors 
to statehood argue that because the part of the District that would be made 
into a new state was once ceded by Maryland, the consent of Maryland 
would be necessary before the District could become a state. 176 However, a 
literal interpretation of the Constitution provides little support for this the-
ory because even if Maryland had clearly expressed some continuing interest 
in the District when it ceded its land to Congress in 1788, the District is 
surely not now "within the Jurisdiction" of Maryland, a state that has 
lacked authority over the territory for nearly two hundred years. 177 
gress may lack the power to bind successor Congresses with legislation that is purportedly 
permanent. See Eule, supra note 166, at 379. But by dint of the constitutional authority to 
create states, U.S. CONST. art. IV, section 3, statehood legislation may be an exception to this 
principle. Many eyebrows would be raised if Congress purported to pass a statute repealing 
the law that admitted Oregon to the Union. 
173. Act of July 9, 1846, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35. 
174. D. C. Statehood Hearings Part 1, supra note 39, at 369 (statement of Stephen J. 
Markman, Assistant Attorney General). A taxpayer constitutionally challenged the retroces-
sion in Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130 (1875), but the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
challenge on the ground that, whether or not the retrocession had been lawful, Virginia was 
the de facto sovereign and that the plaintiff was estopped from challenging such a sovereignty. 
Professor Raven-Hansen has noted in private conversation that the First Congress, which 
included many of the l<ramers of the Constitution, also changed the boundaries of the District, 
enlarging them to include the mouth of a river. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 17, I Stat. 214. 
Although this Act appears not to have ceded any land, it does suggest that the Framers 
thought the District's boundaries less than immutable. 
175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. I. 
176. See D.C. Statehood Hearings Part 1, supra note 39, at 343 (statement of Stephen J. 
Markman, Assistant Attorney General). 
177. Professor Seidman has noted in private correspondence that the force of this argument 
depends on when, precisely, the new state had to be "within the jurisdiction" of the old state 
for the constitutional clause to be operative. Although the District is not presently within the 
348 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 39:311 
In addition, Professor Raven-Hansen has shown that the Maryland legis-
lature used absolute and unconditional language to cede the land, 178 
although clauses retaining reversionary interests in land, in the event the 
grantee no longer needed it for a particular purpose, were in common use at 
the time and were in fact used for grants of land to the Federal Govem-
ment.179 Raven-Hansen indicates that to whatever extent a state can be said 
to have an intention, Maryland's intention was to divest itself of any interest 
in the land. One could argue, of course, that no one in Maryland could have 
contemplated an eventual District bid for statehood and that therefore 
Maryland cannot be said to have had an intention to divest so completely its 
interest, or that because Maryland ceded its land for the limited purpose of 
creating a federal district, it imposed an "implied condition" on its land 
grant, the unconditional language of its cession statute notwithstanding. 180 
The final constitutional objection to statehood is that the twenty-third 
amendment, which grants three Presidential electors to the "District consti-
tuting the seat of Government of the United States," 181 precludes elimina-
tion of the District of Columbia because the amendment would then be 
meaningless and equally precludes shrinkage of the District to the White 
House, Capitol, and Mall area because then a handful of people living in that 
small territory, such as the President and his or her spouse, could control 
three electoral votes. 182 
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the twenty-third amend-
ment was not self-executing. It authorized Congress to "direct" the method 
of selection of electors from the District and to "enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation."183 The amendment became part of the Constitution 
on April 3, 1961, when its ratification by the legislatures of three-fourths of 
the states was certified. 184 Congress did not pass legislation providing for 
jurisdiction of Maryland, the land that now comprises the District was within Maryland in the 
eighteenth century. Should statehood admission be viewed as a separate act, because it occurs 
200 years after cession, or as merely the second stage of a 200-year process? 
178. The land was "forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress am~ Government of the 
United States, and full and absolute right and exclusive jurisdiction." Md. Act of 1791, ch. 45, 
reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. 33, 34-35 (1981). 
179. See Hearings on Constitutional and Economic Issues, supra note 108, at 45-46 (pre-
pared statement of Prof. Peter Raven-Hansen of George Washington University). 
180. J. BEST, supra note 44, at 69. 
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § l. 
182. See D.C Statehood Hearings Part 1, supra note 39, at 343 (statement of Stephen J. 
Markman, Assistant Attorney General). 
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 2. 
184. S. REP. No. 869, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1961). 
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the popular election of presidential electors until six months later. 185 If the 
United States had held a Presidential election before enabling legislation had 
been passed, the District would not have been able to participate. 186 Simi-
larly, if, as part of the act admitting the District to the Union, Congress 
merely repealed the law that provides a method for choosing electors, the 
electoral status of what remained the District of Columbia would revert to 
what it was during the summer of 1961. If there happened to be any persons 
residing in it who did not vote in the states, 187 they would not be entitled to 
vote for presidential electors. Congress could then at its leisure propose re-
pealing the twenty-third amendment, which would have no further utility. 
The constitutional arguments against statehood are unpersuasive, but they 
are politically weighty. These arguments have enjoyed the support of the 
Department of Justice not only in the Reagan administration, but in several 
185. Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-389, § 1(1), 75 Stat. 817,817 (codified as amended 
at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1301 (1987)). 
186. This is not an imaginative interpretation of the twenty-third amendment; Congress 
intended the amendment not to be self-executing. This colloquy took place in the House dur-
ing debate on the resolution to propose the amendment: 
Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. But if the Congress fails to take any action whatso-
ever, the people would not be permitted to vote in the District of Columbia? 
Mr. MEADER. I think it would take affirmative action by the Congress before 
anyone could vote (or electors in the District of Columbia. Does not the gentleman 
agree with me? 
Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. I agree it would take affirmative action, and that 
under the affirmative action the Congress could set the qualifications for electors or 
the voters. 
106 CoNG. REc. 12,560 (1960). Representative Meader made the further point that the lan-
guage of the amendment authorized the District to "appoint," not elect, electors, just as article 
II, section 1 of the Constitution authorizes states to "appoint" electors in a manner directed by 
their legislatures. Indeed, a congressional committee had expressly rejected the language of 
the amendment resolution as originally introduced, which would have provided for the "peo-
ple" of the District to "elect" presidential electors in a manner to be provided by Congress. I d. 
Congress subsequently chose to authorize the popular election of presidential electors, but the 
colloquy suggests that no particular District resident, including members of the presidential 
family, could legitimately expect, absent enabling legislation, to have a right to participate in 
the selection of presidential electors. 
187. Presidents and their families have traditionally voted in the states jn which they re-
sided before they occupied the White House rather than in the District of Columbia. If there 
were other residents of the portion of the District that did not become a new state, they could 
vote in the new state by virtue of its Constitution. NEW COLUMBIA CONST. § 1110, 1 D.C. 
CODE ANN. 117, 162 (Supp. 1989). If New Columbia repealed that portion of its Constitution, 
Congress could nevertheless authorize such persons to vote for federal officers in New Colum-
bia, just as it has permitted United States citizens living abroad to vote for federal officers in 
the states in which they formerly resided, notwithstanding state election laws to the contrary. 
42 u.s.c. § 1973dd-1 (1982). 
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of its predecessors. 188 Members of Congress opposed to statehood echo 
them, 189 and they would provide good camouflage for a President who 
wanted to veto a statehood admission act without appearing to be a foe of 
home rule or voting representation in Congress. 
III. THE REQUIREMENT OF STRATEGY 
This analysis suggests that while statehood would provide both real power 
in the two Houses of Congress190 and genuine self-determination for District 
residents, those seeking to achieve statehood face exceedingly difficult 
odds. 191 Moreover, statehood is not the only means to enhance the political 
liberty of those living in the District. Congress could reduce the extent to 
which it treats the District's residents like colonial subjects in many ways. 192 
Ironically, efforts to reform home rule may be politically damaging to the 
drive toward statehood. By improving its political autonomy through statu-
tory reforms, the District may simultaneously undermine its most compel-
ling arguments for equal treatment. For example, obtaining the right to 
have one voting member in each House of Congress would largely under-
mine the politically appealing claim of being subject to "taxation without 
representation." Achieving many of the assurances of self-determination de-
scribed throughout this Article could considerably narrow the disparity be-
188. See D. C. Statehood Hearings Part I, supra note 39, at 354, 374 (statement of Stephen 
J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General, paraphrasing memoranda from Justice Department 
officials in the Kennedy and Carter administrations). 
189. See, e.g., D.C. Statehood, Part 2: Markups on H.R. 51 Before the House Comm. on the 
District of Columbia, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 90, 92 (prepared statement of Rep. Thomas J. 
Bliley, Jr.); id. at 126, 131 (prepared statement of Rep. Stan Parris); id. at 104, 107 (prepared 
statement of Rep. Larry Combest). 
190. Statehood would bring the District greater influence over national affairs in other 
ways as well. For example, President George Bush held an "education summit" with the 
nation's governors, including those of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, in September 1989. 
Although District schools have been experiencing one of the country's most severe crises, the 
District was excluded from the conference because it has no "governor." D. C. Officials Dis-
mayed at Lack of an Invitation, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at A4, col. 4. 
191. Some members of Congress might prefer statehood for the District rather than a slow 
process of reform. Supporters of statehood might include those who believe in full self-deter-
mination for all Americans, those who think that Congress wastes too much time by debating 
local issues every year, and those who would prefer not to have to choose between voting their 
consciences to support a liberal District Council and avoiding frequent political exposure on 
issues that are often highly emotional. Cf. 135 CONG. REC. H6549 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) 
(statement of Rep. Hoyer). Supporting the D.C. Council's ban on discrimination against 
homosexuals "is subject to a 30-second ad ... and they can say, 'Steny Hoyer is for homosexu-
als,' and somehow put in fear those who will go to the polls and select [Hoyer]." Id. 
192. Comparisons between the political status of the District and that of a colony have 
often been made. See, e.g., S. SMITH, supra note 6. For a thumbnail description of Washing-
ton, D.C. as a colony, seeP. ScHRAG, supra note 37, at 9-10. 
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tween the independence people have in the District and the independence 
people enjoy in the states, but at the cost of undercutting the drive toward 
full political freedom. Gradual reform through incremental improvements 
may be much easier to achieve than statehood, but it may make the achieve-
ment of statehood impossible. 193 
The sixty to forty vote for the initiative that led to the District's statehood 
petition194 indicates that the people of the District support full membership 
in the Union. But construing that vote as a strategic choice in favor of state-
hood or as a genuine, deep, and continued commitment to a new political 
order would be fallacious. First, the political atmosphere has changed since 
the vote a decade ago. 195 Second, no one has put before the electorate an 
alternative strategy of seeking a gradual improvement in political rights. 
Third, the lack of congressional interest in statehood for the District has 
been mirrored by an apparent lack of interest in the District itself. 
Aside from the lobbying efforts of Delegate Walter Fauntroy, the speeches 
of Reverend Jesse Jackson, and the educational endeavors of a stalwart band 
of activists who comprise the Statehood Commission, 196 the statehood issue 
has been barely visible since 1982. Until Reverend Jackson suggested his 
interest in running to become one of the District's "Senators," District news-
papers and radio stations rarely discussed the issue. Few voluntary organi-
zations have pressed for, or even endorsed, statehood. There have been no 
mass demonstrations supporting the concept. 197 The Council repeatedly 
193. It is possible, of course, to make exactly the opposite argument, that statehood would 
become more likely after a period in which Americans became accustomed to a fully self-
governing District of Columbia, particularly one that voted in Congress. But it seems more 
likely that the political imperative of granting the District statehood rests on the perceived 
injustice of its unequal status and, particularly, on the fact that District .residents have no 
voting representation in Congress. If its moral claims to statehood based on its quasi-colonial 
status were removed, the District would probably have trouble making a claim on the national 
agenda. 
194. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, Official Results of Nov. 4, 1980, General Elec-
tion, at 003.000 (Table). The initiative is codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-ll1 (1981). 
195. Two subsequent votes provide even less clear indications that the District's residents 
favor statehood. The 1981 election of delegates to a statehood constitutional convention was 
not a vote on statehood because the ballot did not include the option of not holding such a 
convention; the only choice was among candidates for delegate. Similarly, the 53-47 vote rati-
fying the constitution drafted by the convention was not a vote on statehood, but only a vote 
supporting the proposed constitution in the event that the District became a state. See D.C. 
Board of Elections & Ethics, Election Results for Nov. 2, 1982. 
196. The Statehood Commission is a public body established by the 1980 Statehood Initia-
tive, charged with advancing the cause of District Statehood. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-115 
(1981). 
197. Even a statehood rally that Reverend Jackson called for on Martin Luther King Jr.'s 
Birthday, 1990, "failed to materialize and instead became a news conference.'' Loose Lips, 
Wash. City Paper, Feb. 16, 1990, at 4, col. l. The Mayor and Council of the District have 
352 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 39:311 
postponed the elections, called for in the 1980 initiative, for a Representative 
and Senators, who would become highly visible advocates for statehood on 
Capitol Hill. 198 Most importantly, neither the business nor the political 
leadership of the District has attempted to rally support for statehood 
among the people who have the political power to bring it about: the citi-
zens of the fifty states. The constitutional amendment that would have given 
the District voting representation in Congress passed the Senate in 1978 pri-
marily because the Senate viewed the amendment as a civil rights issue. Re-
publican Senator Strom Thurmond and other Southern senators with 
substantial numbers of black constituents in their home states supported the 
amendment after Delegate Fauntroy took the issue on the road. 199 No one 
since has undertaken a comparable national political campaign on behalf of 
District statehood. 
If incremental reform of home rule and statehood are mutually inconsis-
tent objectives, the first step to move the District beyond the present drift 
would be to put the strategic choice into focus for the leadership and electo-
rate of the District. After a period of public debate about alternative strate-
gies, the people should be asked to decide whether they really want 
statehood, taking into account the likelihood that they will have to work 
harder to achieve it in the coming decade than they have to this point and 
that pressing for statehood may require foregoing other reforms that could 
undermine the District's moral claim to admission to the Union. This 
choice should be expressed through a new referendum, and the Council, or 
the people directly through an intiative campaign, should now set into mo-
tion the process of a new District-wide vote on statehood. 200 
occasionally acted to support the District's statehood bid (for example, by enacting a less con-
troversial state constitution than the one ratified by the voters). D.C. Act No. 7-19 (1987) 
(codified at D.C. CODE ANN.§ 1-113 (Supp. 1989)); see also NEW COLUMBIA CONST., 1 D.C. 
CoDE ANN. 117 (Supp. 1989) (enacted 1987). They have tended, however, to follow rather 
than lead the electorate on this issue. A voter initiative, rather than the Mayor or the Council, 
started the process of seeking statehood, and only three of the thirteen Council members 
sought office as delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The Mayor also chose not to run. 
P. SCHRAG, supra note 37, at 20-28. 
198. Now the elections are to be held, but the District will require its officials and their 
staffs to be paid by privately raised funds. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
199. SeeP. SCHRAG, supra note 37, at 23. 
200. A new referendum is warranted in any event because no one submitted the Council's 
action in 1987, which replaced the proposed constitution that the voters ratified in 1982, with 
one drafted by the Council for voter approval. While voter approval is not legally necessary 
because Congress will dictate what constitution goes into effect or what procedures are neces-
sary for putting a constitution into effect, a constitution ratified by the voters should not be 
changed without further voter approval. Indeed, the proposed constitution which the voters 
ratified specified that the constitution could be amended by the Council, but that the amend-
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The new referendum should produce a reaffirmation of the desirability of 
statehood and a renewed commitment of energy to the task of obtaining it. 
Congress' actions over the last three or four years give the District no reason 
to expect that incremental reform will be forthcoming. 201 Furthermore, the 
ultimate argument against incremental reform and in favor of statehood is 
the revocability of any reforms not entrenched or perpetuated either by a 
constitutional amendment or by admission of the District to the Union.202 
ments should then be taken back to the voters in a referendum. NEW COLUMBIA CONST. art. 
XVIII,§ 9, reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 116 (Supp. 1989) (proposed constitution). 
201. Indeed, Congress appears remarkably hostile to such reforms. In 1989, when the Sen-
ate Energy and Natural Resources Committee defined the options to be considered by the 
voters in a plebiscite on the future of Puerto Rico, some Senators proposed that continued 
Commonwealth status, if that were chosen by Puerto Rican voters, should include a non-
voting "Senate representative" with a staff of accredited Senate employees. The representative 
would not have been able to speak on the floor or to vote in committee. This proposal was 
defeated in the Committee because it might have set a precedent for granting similar privileges 
to the District of Columbia. Havemann, Senate Voice for Puerto Rico Opposed, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 2, 1989, at AS, col. l. The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee did accept 
the concept of permitting the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to have a "liaison office" whose 
staff would have the privileges enjoyed by employees of the Congressional Research Service 
rather than the privileges given to the staff members of Senate offices. Havemann, Panel Passes 
Referendum on Puerto Rico's Status, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al2, col. l. 
202. See supra notes 152-66 and accompanying text. My colleague Louis Michael Seidman 
argues that even statehood could not protect the present District against congressional legisla-
tion directed only at the new state's residents because the power of Congress under the com-
merce clause is essentially unbounded, "no Supreme Court case has held that discrimination 
among states is unconstitutional," and "the Court has permitted such discrimination even in 
the teeth of the express constitutional requirement of uniformity in the areas of bankruptcy 
and taxation." Seidman, supra note 31, at 407. 
Seidman's arguments are ingenious but not entirely persuasive. First, while Seidman is cor-
rect in saying that the Court has never invalidated a federal statute effective only in one state, 
the Court appears never to have upheld such a law either. Indeed, the rarity, or perhaps total 
absence, of such legislation tends to suggest that Congress believes that legislating for particu-
lar states, as it routinely does for the District and the territories, would violate principles of 
equal protection. Second, while Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 
U.S. 528 (1985), rejected the view that certain state powers were immune under the tenth 
amendment from invasion by Congress, the issue of whether Congress could target only cer-
tain states for the application of federal law was not raised or addressed in that case. Finally, 
Seidman cites two cases for his proposition that the Court has on occasion permitted "such" 
discrimination, but in neither case was the application of federal law congruent with state 
boundaries. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), the federal 
law at issue applied not to one state, but to all of the states in a certain region, and to portions 
of three other contiguous states. In United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983), the special 
tax exemption provided by Congress was described in a statute as one applicable to "Alaskan 
oil," id. at 77, but the Court made a point of noting, as it upheld the legislation, that this 
description was "not entirely accurate," id., that "less than 20% of current Alaskan produc-
tion is exempt" id., from tax, that oil produced in "certain offshore territorial waters - be-
yond the limits of any State- is [also exempt]," and that "[t]he exemption thus is not drawn 
on state political lines" id. at 78 (emphasis added). The Court upheld rational distinctions 
based on bona fide geographical differences "based on neutral factors." !d. at 85. However, 
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While the liberty of the District's 600,000 residents could be enhanced in 
many ways short of statehood, statehood represents the best way of perma-
nently securing for our fellow Americans residing in the Nation's Capital the 
political privileges that we who live in the fifty states have always taken for 
granted. 
the Court's explicit notation that Congress did not use state boundaries to define those geo-
graphical differences suggests that, in its view, federal legislation applicable only to one or two 
states would be of dubious validity. 
Seidman also argues that Congress could circumvent a constitutional ban on state-by-state 
legislation by defining certain states descriptively rather than by naming them. Seidman, supra 
note 31, at 408. Courts would be quite capable, however, of determining whether the differ-
ences in applicable law were rationally related to the differences defined by the congressional 
descriptions. To use Seidman's example, there could be no reasonable justification for congres-
sional approval of religiously-based discrimination against homosexuals only in states with 
large numbers of federal employees. /d. at 404-05. 
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APPENDIX* 
Significant District of Columbia Appropriation Riders 
Approved by Congress, FY 1975-1989 
355 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-405, 88 Stat. 
822 (1974). 
General Operating Expenses: 
D.C. cannot spend more than $7,500 on "test borings and soil 
investigations. "203 
Human Resources: 
Total reimbursement to St. Elizabeths Hospital shall not exceed the 
amount paid in FY 1970.204 
Highways & Traffic: 
No funds are available "for the purchase of driver-training vehicles."205 
• N.B. To aid the user of this Appendix, the act in which the restriction first appeared is 
in bold face print and the restriction heading is in italics. 
203. District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-405, 88 Stat. 822, 823 
(1974) (1975 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
333, 90 Stat. 785, 786 (1975) (not to exceed $1875) (1976 Appropriation); District of Columbia 
Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-446, 90 Stat. 1490, 1491 (1976) (1977 Appropria-
tion); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-288, 92 Stat. 281, 282 
(1977) (1978 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-
373,92 Stat. 699, 700 (1978) (1979 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-93, 93 Stat. 713, 714 (1979) (1980 Appropriation); District of Columbia 
Appropriation Act, 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 3121, 3122 (1980) (1981 Appropria-
tion); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-91, 95 Stat. 1173, 1173-74 
(1981) (1982 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-
378, 96 Stat. 1925, 1926 (1982) (1983 Appropriation) .. 
204. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 824-25; 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. 'at 788; 1977 
Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1492; 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 284; 1979 Appropriation, 92 
Stat. at 701 ($20,919,500 limit); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 715 ($18,691,800 limit); 1981 
Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3123-24 ($21,348, 700 limit); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1177 
($22,948,700 limit); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1928 ($24,748,700 limit); District of Co-
lumbia Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-125, 97 Stat. 819, 822 (1983) ($5,700,000 and 
$29,448,700 limits) (1984 Appropriation); Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,737 (1984) 
($55,207,000 limit)) (1985 Appropriation); Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190,99 Stat. 
!l85, 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,089 (1985) 
($55,207,000 limit)) (1986 Appropriation); Act of Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 
3341-180, 3341-185 ($71,200,000 limit) (1987 Appropriation). 
205. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 825; 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 788; 1977 Appro-
priation, 90 Stat. at 1492; 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 284; 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 
702; 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 715; 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3124; 1982 Appro-
priation, 95 Stat. at 1177; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1928; 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. 
at 822. 
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Environmental Services: 
No funds are available for the collecting of ashes or miscellaneous re-
fuse from hotels, businesses, or rooming/boarding houses. 206 
Capital Outlay: 
The Woodrow Wilson High School swimming pool cannot be used after 
9 p.m.2o1 
General Provisions: 
"[A]ll vouchers covering expenditures of appropriations ... shall be 
audited before payment .... " 208 
An amount specified within this Act for particular purposes shall be 
considered the maximum amount which may be expended for said pur-
pose or object. 209 
206. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 825; 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 789; 1977 Appro-
priation, 90 Stat. at 1492; 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 285; 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 
702; 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 716; 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3124; 1982 Appro-
priation, 95 Stat. at 1177; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1928; 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. 
at 822; 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 
CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,738 (1984)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 31,088, 31,089 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. 
at 3341-185; District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 
1329-90, 1329-94 (1987) (1988 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 
1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 102 Stat. 2269, 2269-4 (1988) (1989 Appropriation). 
207. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 826. 
208. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 827 (§ I); 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 790 (§ I); 
1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1493 (§ 102); 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 286 (§ 201); 1979 
Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 703 (§ 201); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 717 (§ 201); 1981 Ap-
propriation, 94 Stat. at 3126 (§ 102); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1179 (§ 102); 1983 Ap-
propriation, 96 Stat. at 1931 (§ 102); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 825 (§ 102); 1985 
Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 
23,737, 23,739 (1984) (§ 102)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 31,088, 31,090 (1985) (§ 102)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 
Stat. at 3341-188 (§ 102); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-98 (§ 102); 19S9 Appropria-
tion, 102 Stat. at 2269-8 (§ 102). 
209. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 827 (§ 2); 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 790 (§ 2); 
1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1494 (§ 103); 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 286 (§ 202); 1979 
Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 703 (§ 202); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 717 (§ 202); 1981 Ap-
propriation, 94 Stat. at 3126 (§ 103); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1179 (§ 102); 1983 Ap-
propriation, 96 Stat. at 1931 (§ 103); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 825 (§ 103); 1985 
Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 
23,737, 23,739 (1984) (§ 103)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. 31,088, 31,090 (1985) (§ 103)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 
Stat. at 3341-188 (§ 103); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-98 (§ 103); 1989 Appropria-
tion, 102 Stat. at 2269-8. 
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No appropriation shall be used in connection with any regulation of the 
Public Service Commission requiring the installation of taxicab 
meters. 210 
No funds are available for payment of electric rates in excess of 2 cents 
per kilowatt-hour for street lighting.211 
No funds shall be obligated for payment to any permanent employee if 
the total number of D.C. employees exceeds 39,619.212 
No funds appropriated for educational purposes may be used for parti-
san political activities. 213 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-446, 90 Stat. 
1490 (1976). 
210. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 827 (§ 5); 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 791 (§ 5); 
1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1494 (§ 106); 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 287 (§ 205); 1979 
Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 704 (§ 205); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 717 (§ 205); 1981 Ap-
propriation, 94 Stat. at 3126 (§ 106); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1180 (§ 106); 1983 Ap-
propriation, 96 Stat. at 1931 (§ 106); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 825 (§ 106); 1985 
Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 
23,737, 23,739 (1984) (§ 106)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,090 (1985) (§ 106)). 
211. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 827 (§ 6); 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 791 (§ 6); 
1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1494 (§ 107); 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 287 (§ 206); 1979 
Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 704 (§ 206); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 717 (§ 206). 
212. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 828 (§ 13); 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 791-92 
(§ 13); 1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1495 (§ 114, limit of 35,145 employees); 1978 Appro-
priation, 92 Stat. at 288 (§ 213, limit of 36,000 employees); 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 705 
(§ 213, limit of 37,161 employees); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 718 (§ 213, limit of 37,886 
employees); 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3127 (§ 112, limit of 35,313 employees); 1982 
Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1180 (§ 112, limit of 32,950 employees); 1983 Appropriation, 96 
Stat. at 1932 (§ 112, limit of 33,268 employees); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 826 (§ 112, 
limit of 30,417 employees); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 
1088, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CoNG. REc. 27,379, 27,382 (1984) (§ 111, limit of 
31,546 employees)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 419, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. 34,784, 34,786 (1985) (§ 111, limit of 
32,511 employees)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-189 (§ 110, limit of 33,549 employ-
ees); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 110,limit of 37,393 employees); 1989 Appro-
priation, 102 Stat. at 2269-8 to -9 (§ 110, limit of 38,471 employees). 
213. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 828 (§ 14); 1976 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 792 (§ 14); 
1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1495 (§ 115); 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 288 (§ 214); 1979 
Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 705 (§ 214); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 718 (§ 214); 1981 Ap-
propriation, 94 Stat. at 3127 (§ 113); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 (§ 113); 1983 Ap-
propriation, 96 Stat. at 1932 (§ 113); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 826 (§ 113); 1985 
Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 
23,737, 23,739-40 (1984) (§ 112)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,091 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. 
at 3341-189 (§ 111); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 111); 1989 Appropriation, 
102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 111 ). 
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Human Resources: 
$13,733,000 shall be available for the "care and treatment of the men-
tally retarded at Forest Haven."214 
General Provisions: 
No funds shall be available for compensation to persons performing 
public affairs or public relations services unless approved by a resolu-
tion of the D.C. Council.215 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95·288, 92 Stat. 
281 (1977). 
Capital Outlay: 
No funds appropriated for the Washington Civic Center shall be obli-
gated until the plans submitted by the Mayor and the Council are ap-
proved by the House and Senate Subcommittees on D.C. 
Appropriations. 216 
No funds appropriated for the construction of the University of the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be obligated until the master plan is approved by 
the Mayor, the Council, and the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations. 217 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-373, 92 Stat. 
699 (1978). 
General Provisions: 
No funds shall be paid for any judgment entered against the District of 
Columbia as a result of the 2 cents per kilowatt-hour limitation.218 
No funds are available for the compensation of any D.C. employee 
"whose name and s.alary are not available for public inspection."219 
214. 1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1492; 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 284 
($15,134,700); 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 701 ($15,504,700). 
215. 1977 Appropriation, 90 Stat. at 1495 (§ 117). 
216. 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 285-86; 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 703. 
217. 1978 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 286. 
218. 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 704 (§ 207); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 717 
(§ 207). 
219. 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 705 (§ 218); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 719 
(§ 218); 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3127 (§ 116); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 
(§ 116); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 (§ 116); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 
(§ 117); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 
CONG. REc. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 116)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 
3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 116)); 1987 Appropria-
tion, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 115); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 115); 1989 
Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 11 5). 
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No funds in this appropriation shall be available "to support or defeat 
legislation pending before Congress or any State legislature. "220 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-93, 93 Stat. 
713 (1979). 
Human Support Services: 
No funds shall be available for the summer youth jobs program until 
the House and Senate Subcommittees on D.C. Appropriations have ap-
proved the plan submitted by the Mayor and the Council detailing 
expenditures. 221 
General Provisions: 
No funds shall be expended for the compensation of any D.C. employee 
"whose, name, title, grade, salary, past work experience, and salary his-
tory are not available for inspection" by the House or Senate Appropri-
ations Committee or their representatives. 222 
No Federal funds may be used to perform abortions unless the mother 
is endangered, or a victim of rape or incest, and where the incident has 
been reported promptly to the police or the public health service. Con-
traceptives and procedures for termination of ectopic pregnancy are 
exempted. 223 
220. 1979 Appropriation, 92 Stat. at 705 (§ 219); 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 719 
(§ 219); 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3127 (§ 117); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 
(§ 117); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 (§ 117); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 
(§ 118); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 
CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 117)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 
3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REC. 31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 117)); 1987 Appropria-
tion, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 116); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 116); 1989 
Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 116). 
221. 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 715; 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3124; 1982 Ap-
propriation, 95 Stat. at 1177. 
222. 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 719 (§ 216); 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3127 
(§ 114); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 (§ 114); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 
(§ 114); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 826 (§ 115); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 114)); 1986 
Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 
31,088, 31,191 (1985) (§ 114)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-189 (§ 113); 1988 Ap-
propriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 113); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 113). 
223. 1980 Appropriation, 93 Stat. at 719 (§ 220); 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3127-28 
(§ 118); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 (§ 118); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 
(§ 118); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 (§ 119); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 118)); 1986 
Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in 131 CONG. REC. 34,784, 34,786 (1985) (§ 118)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 
3341-190 (§ 117); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-99 (§ 117); 1989 Appropriation, 102 
Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 117, eliminated exception for rape or incest victims and forbids use of funds 
for contraceptives and termination of ectopic pregnancy). 
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District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 
3121 (1980). 
Governmental Direction and Support: 
Only "$500,000 of this appropriation shall be available for settlement of 
property damage claims not in excess of $1,500 each and personal in-
jury claims not in excess of $5,000. " 224 
General Provisions: 
No funds shall be expended for consulting services hired through pro-
curement contracts unless expenditures of those contracts "are a matter 
of public record and [are] available for public inspection," except where 
governed by existing law, "or under existing Executive order issued 
pursuant to existing law."225 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-91, 95 Stat. 
1173 (1981). 
Governmental Direction and Support: 
No funds "appropriated for the Office of Financial Management shall 
be apportioned and payable for debt service for short-term borrowing 
on the bond market."226 
The D.C. Retirement Board shall provide Congress with "a quarterly 
report of the allocations of charges by fund and of expenditures of all 
funds. "227 
224. 1981 Appropriation, 94 Stat. at 3122. 
225. /d. at 3125 (§ 101); 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1179 (§ 101); 1983 Appropriation, 
96 Stat. at 1931 (§ 101); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 825 (§ 101); 1985 Appropriation, 98 
Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REc. 23,737, 23,739 (1984) 
(§ 101)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CONG. REC. 31,088,31,090 (1985) (§ 101)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-188 (§ 101); 
1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-98 (§ 101); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-7 
(§ 101). 
226. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1174; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1926. 
227. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1174; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1926; 1984 
Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 820 (quarterly report to Council required); 1985 Appropriation, 98 
Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REc. 23,737, 23,737 (1984) 
(same)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CoNG. REC. 31,088, 31,089 (1985) (same)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-182 (same); 
1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-91 (same); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-1 
(same). 
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Economic Development and Regulation: 
The District will establish a special fund to assure that any funds "avail-
able to the Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board shall be de-
rived from non-Federal" District revenues.228 
Lottery and Charitable Games Enterprise Fund: 
The D.C. Auditor "shall conduct a comprehensive audit on the finan-
cial status of the Fund," and shall provide the report to the Mayor, the 
D.C. Council Chairman, and Senate and House Subcommittees on D.C. 
appropriations. 229 
There shall be no advertising of lottery or charitable games on public 
transportation and at their stops and stations. 230 
The advertising, sale, operation, or playing of these games is forbidden 
in "the Federal enclave, and in adjacent public buildings and land con-
trolled by the Shipstead-Luce Act, ... as well as in the Old Georgetown 
Historic District. "231 
The Lottery Board shall make an annual report to the House and Sen-
ate Subcommittees on D.C. Appropriations at the end of the year de-
tailing receipts and disbursements of the· Board. 232 
Public Education System: 
This appropriation is not available to subsidize the education of nonres-
idents at the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) unless the 
UDC Board of Trustees adopts a tuition rate schedule for nonresidents 
at a level no lower than the nonresident tuition rate charged at compa-
rable schools in the metropolitan area. 233 
228. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1174; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1931 (establish-
ment ofspecia1 fund deleted); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 825 (same); 1985 Appropriation, 
98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,739 (1984) 
(same)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CONG. REc. 31,088, 31,090 (1985) (same)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-188 (same); 
1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-97 (same); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-7 
(same). 
229. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1175. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 1176; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1927; 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 822; 
1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REC. 
23,737, 23,738 (1984)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,089 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-184; 
1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-94; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-4. 
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Capital Outlay: 
The Mayor shall not request "the advance of any moneys for new gen-
eral fund capital improvement projects without the approval by resolu-
tion" of the D.C. Councit.234 
General Provisions: 
"At the start of the fiscal year, the Mayor shall develop an annual plan" 
for borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. After each quarter, the Mayor 
will report to the Council and Congress "the actual borrowing and 
spending progress compared with projections. "235 
The Mayor shall not spend any monies borrowed for capital projects on 
operating expenses. 236 
No funds appropriated in this act may be used to implement a person-
nel lottery for hiring fire fighters or policemen. 237 
No funds appropriated may be used to transport any wastes generated 
by the D.C. municipal waste system for disposal at any public or private 
landfills, except those currently used in Virginia or Maryland, "until the 
appropriate State agency has issued the required permits."238 
234. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1179; 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1930; 1984 
Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 824. 
235. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1181 (§ 119); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 
(§ 119); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 (§ 120); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. 1837 (citing 
H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 119)); 1986 Appro-
priation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. 31,088, 
31,091 (1985) (§ 119)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 118); 1988 Appropria-
tion, 101 Stat. at 1329-100 (§ 118); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 118). 
236. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1182 (§ 121); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 
(§ 121); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 (§ 121); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 121)); 1986 
Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 
31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 121)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 120); 1988 Ap-
propriation, 10 I Stat. at 1329-100 (§ 120); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 120). 
237. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1182 (§ 122); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 
(§ 122); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 (§ 123); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 122)); 1986 
Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. 
31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 122)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 121); 1988 Ap-
propriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-100 (§ 121); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 121). 
238. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1182 (§ 123); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1934 
(§ 128); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 828 (§ 129); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 128)); 1986 
Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 
31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 128)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-191 (§ 127). 
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No Federal funds shall be obligated or expended to procure passenger 
autos with an EPA estimated MPG average of less than 22, except for 
security, emergency rescue, or armored vehicles.239 
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-378, 96 Stat. 
1925 (1982). 
Water and Sewer Enterprise Fund: 
All restrictions applying to general fund capital improvements under 
the heading of Capital Outlay "shall apply to projects approved under 
this heading." (E.g., expiration of authorization at the end of the fiscal 
year, no advance monies unless prior approval by a D.C. Council 
resolution. )240 
Federal Payment to the District of Columbia: 
None of the Federal payment shall be available until there are at least 
3,880 uniformed permanent officers of the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, excluding officers hired after August 19, 1982, under standards 
other than those in effect at that time. 241 
General Provisions: 
"The Mayor shall not borrow any funds" from the United States Treas-
ury unless he has prior approval by resolution from the D.C. Council, 
"identifying the projects and amounts to be financed with such 
borrowings. "242 
239. 1982 Appropriation, 95 Stat. at 1182 (§ 125); 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1934 
(§ 125); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 (§ 126); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 125)); 1986 
Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., lst Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. 
31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 125)); 1987 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 124); 1988 Ap-
propriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-100 (§ 124); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-10 (§ 124). 
240. 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1930; 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 824; 1985 Ap-
propriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 23,737, 
23,739 (1984)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 
131 CONG. REC. 31,088,31,090 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-187; 1988 Ap-
propriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-97; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-7. 
241. 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1925; 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 819; 1985 Ap-
propriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 23,737, 
23,737 (1984)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 
131 CONG. REc. 31,088,31,088 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-180; 1988 Ap-
propriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-90; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269. 
242. 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 (§ 120); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 
(§ 121, deletes reference to U.S. Treasury); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 
5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 120)); 1986 Appropria-
tion, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REC. 31,088, 31,091 
(1985) (§ 120)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 119); 1988 Appropriation, 101 
Stat. at 1329-100 (§ 119); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 (§ 119). 
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"None of the funds appropriated ... may·be obligated or expended by 
reprogramming except pursuant to advance approval" under the proce-
dure set forth in House Report 96-443, which. accompanied the D.C. 
Appropriation Act of 1980.243 
Act of Oct. U, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (Continuing ~esohi· 
tion of 1985). 
Public Safety and Justice: 
The staffing levels of the Fire Department units shall be maintained ac-
cording to Fire Dept. Rules and Regs. Article Ill, section 18 as then in 
effect.244 
General Provisions: 
Amends section 303(b) of the D.C. Self-Government and Government 
Reorganization Act to provide that amendments ratified by the regis-
tered electors shall take effect in 35 days, excluding weekends, holidays, 
and days when either House of Congress is not in session, after submis-
sion unless there is passed a joint resolution to the contrary within that 
period. In any case, a joint resolution passed and transmitted to the 
President within the 35-day period will repeal the amendment.245 
Amends the second sentence of section 412(a) to read: "Except as pro-
vided in the last sentence of this subsection, the Council shall use acts 
for all legislative purposes."246 
Amends the last sentence of section 412(a) to state that resolutions are 
to be used "(1) to express simple determinations, decisions, or direc-
tions of the Council of a special or temporary character; and (2) to ap-
prove or disapprove proposed actions" by administrative agencies in 
accordance with previous legislation. ·Much legislation must specifically 
authorize use of resolutions and the resolutions must be designed to 
implement that act. 247 
243. 1983 Appropriation, 96 Stat. at 1933 (§ 123); 1984 Appropriation, 97 Stat. at 827 
(§ 124); 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 
CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,740 (1984) (§ 123)); 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 
3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,091 (1985).(§ 123)); 1987 Appropria-
tion, 100 Stat. at 3341-190 (§ 122); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-100 (§ 122); 1989 
Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-9 to -10 (§ 122). 
244. 1985 Appropriation, 98 Stat. at 1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 
CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,738 (1984)). 
245. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CoNG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,382 (1984) (§ 13l(b))). 
246. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,382 (1984) (§ 13l(c)(l))). 
247. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,382 (1984) (§ 13i(c)(2))). 
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Amends the second sentence of section 602( c )(1) to read that except as 
provided by paragraph (2), acts of the Council become law after 30 
days, excluding weekends, holidays, and any day when neither House is 
in session because of "an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 
three days, or an adjournment of more than three days." Any joint 
resolution passed by Congress within the 30 day period repeals that act 
upon becoming effective.248 
Amends the third sentence of section 602(c)(l) by inserting "joint" in 
lieu of "concurrent."249 
Amends the first sentence of 602(c)(2) to read that any act transmitted 
"with respect to any Act codified in title 22, 23, or 24" of the D.C. Code 
shall take effect 60 days after transmittal to the Speaker of the House 
and the President of the Senate. A joint resolution passed and sent to 
the President within the 60-day period shall repeal that act when it be-
comes law.250 
Amends the second sentence of section 602(c)(2) to state that the provi-
sions of such expedited procedures shall apply to these joint 
resolutions. 251 
Inserts a severability clause at the end of Part F, Title VII. 252 
Makes this section effective without limitation as to fiscal year.253 
Designates Andrei Sakharov Plaza. 254 
Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 1185 (Continuing Resolu-
tion of 1986). 
Public Safety and Justice: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, each employee who re-
tired from the Fire Department before 2/15/80 and is on the date of the 
enactment of this Act receiving an annuity based on service with the 
248. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,382-83 (1984) (§ 131(d))). 
249. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,383 (1984) (§ 131(e))). 
250. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,383 (1984) (§ 131(f))). 
251. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,383 (1984) (§ 131(g))). 
252. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,383 (1984) (§ 131(1))). 
253. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,379, 27,383 (1984) (§ 131(n))). 
254. /d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1071, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 CONG. 
REC. 27,37~, 27,384 (1984) (§ 133)). 
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Fire Department, shall receive a lump-sum payment equal to three per-
cent of his/her annuity from the D.C. Retirement Board.255 
Up to $50,000 shall be used to reimburse Fairfax County, Virginia, for 
expenses incurred in relation to Lorton Prison. Reimbursement shall be 
made every time the District asks the County to provide police, fire, 
rescue and related services for escape, riots, and similar disturbances 
involving the prison. The District shall make a quarterly report to the 
House and Senate Subcommittees on D.C. Appropriations regarding 
the amount and purpose of any reimbursements. 256 
No appropriated funds may be used to implement any plan which in-
cludes the closing of Engine Company No. 3, located at 439 New Jersey 
Avenue, Northwest. 257 
General Provisions: 
The Public Service Commission is authorized to order and approve 
streetlight deregulation as provided in its opinion and order in Formal 
Case No. 813, provided that the provisions of this opinion and order are 
ratified and declared to be in effect as of7/12/84 and "continue to be in 
effect until revoked or rescinded. "258 
"No State, or political subdivision thereof, in which a Member of Con-
gress maintains a place of abode for the purposes of attending sessions 
of Congress [shall] impose a personal property tax with respect to [any] 
motor vehicle owned by such Member [or spouse,] ... unless such 
Member represents such State or a district in such State." "Member of 
Congress" includes the delegates from Guam, D.C., the Virgin Islands, 
and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico; "State" includes 
D.C.; and "personal property tax" means any tax imposed on an annual 
255. 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,089 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-183 (applied to 23 
employees retiring between 11/24/84 and 5/13/85). 
256. 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. REc. 34,784, 34,785-86 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 
Stat. at 3341-183 (increased to $100,000 and included reimbursement to Prince William 
County); 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-93 (same); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 
2269-3 (same). 
257. 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. REc. 34,784, 34,785 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 
3341-184; 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-93; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-3. 
258. 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,091 (1985) (§ 130)). 
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basis and levied on the basis of market or assessed value. This section 
shall apply to all taxable periods beginning on or after 1/1/85.259 
Designates Raoul Wallen berg Place. 260 
None of the funds appropriated may be used to advertise for, or award 
payments to, contracted professional services as contained in object 
class 408 of the fiscal year 1986 budget at any level which would di-
rectly or indirectly exceed the 1985 level of expenditures or 
$21,780,000, whichever is lesser.261 
Criminal Justice Initiative: 
$20,000,000 shall be available for a prison within the District of Colum-
bia, provided that D.C. shall award a design and construction contract 
on or before 10/15/86, and that D.C. proceeds with the design and 
construction of the prison without regard to the availability of Federal 
funds. 262 
Act of Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-180 (Continuing 
Appropriations of 1987). 
Criminal Justice Initiative: 
"[N]o funds are available for construction on the South part of Square 
E-1112" unless previously approved by the House and Senate Subcom-
mittees on D.C. Appropriations.263 
Governmental Direction and Support: 
D.C. shall "identify the sources of funding for [the] Admission to State-
hood from its own locally-generated revenues ... [and] no revenues 
from Federal sources [may] be used to support the operations or activi-
ties of the Statehood Commission and the Statehood Compact 
Commission. "264 
259. Jd. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. 
REC. 34,784, 34,786 (1985) (§ 131)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-191 (§ 129, added 
prohibition of personal property taxes on leased or rented autos). 
260. 1986 Appropriation, 99 Stat. at 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 
CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,092 (1985) (§ 131)). 
261. Jd. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CoNG. 
REC. 34,784, 34,786 (1985) (§ 134)). 
262. Jd. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 419, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CoNG. 
REC. 34,784, 34,784 (1985)); 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-181; 1988 Appropriation, 
101 Stat. at 1329-91; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-1. 
263. 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-181; 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-91. 
264. 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-182; 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-92; 
1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-2. 
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Public Safety and Justice: 
Within 30 days of this Act's effective date, D.C. "shall establish a free, 
24-hour telephone information service whereby residents of the area" 
around Lorton Prison can promptly obtain information from D.C. offi-
cials regarding "all disturbances at the prison." D.C. shall advertise 
this service to those residents. 265 
No appropriated funds "may be used to implement [D.C.] Board of 
Parole notice of emergency and proposed rulemaking" as filed with the 
D.C. Register on 7/25/86.266 
D.C. shall not "renovate or construct prison bed space at the Occoquan 
facilities of Lorton prison beyond the number of prison bed spaces ... 
damaged or destroyed in the fire of 7 /25/86."267 
Public Education: 
$1,146,000 shall be used to operate Antioch School of Law. The acqui-
sition or merger of Antioch School of Law shall be previously approved 
by both the Board of Trustees for UDC and the D.C. Council, other-
wise this money "shall be used solely for the repayment of the general 
fund deficit. "268 
General Provisions: 
D.C. shall erect three signs on the comers of 16th and Land 16th and 
M Streets containing the words "Sakharov Plaza". The Soviet Em-
bassy's new address is 1 Andrei Sakharov Plaza. 269 
Congress reaffirms the D.C. Council's authority to close part of 8th 
Street, Northwest and public alleys in Square 403.270 
District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 
Stat. 1329-90 (1987). 
Governmental Direction and Support: 
The funds of the Statehood Commission and the Statehood Compact Com-
mission shall not be "used for lobbying to support or defeat legislation pend-
ing before Congress or any State legislature."271 
265. 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-183; 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-93; 
1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-3. 
266. 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-184; 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-93; 
1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-3. 
267. 1987 Appropriation, 100 Stat. at 3341-184. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 3341-192 (§ 132). 
270. Id. (§ 133). 
271. 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-92; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-2. 
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Economic Development and Regulation: 
"[U]p to $270,000 within the 15 percent set-aside for special programs 
within the Tenant Assistance Program shall be targeted for the single 
room occupancy initiative."272 
General Provisions: 
"No sole source contract with the [D.C.] government or any agency 
thereof may be renewed or extended without opening that contract to 
the competitive bidding process as set forth in Section 303 of the [D.C.] 
Procurement Practices Act of 1985 .. .''273 
"Federal funds hereafter appropriated to the [D.C.] government shall 
not be subject to apportionment except to the extent specifically noted 
by statute.''274 
District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 102 
Stat. 2269 (1988). 
Criminal Justice Initiative: 
Construction of the prison in D.C. may not commence unless (1) "ac-
cess and parking for construction vehicles are provided solely at a loca-
tion other than city streets," (2) D.C. officials meet monthly with 
neighborhood representatives, (3) D.C. operates and maintains a free, 
24-hour telephone information service for residents living in the area 
surrounding the prison so that they "can promptly obtain information 
... [regarding any] disturbances at the prison," and (4) D.C. advertise 
this service. 275 
Public Safety and Justice: 
Staffing levels at two piece engine companies within the Fire Depart-
ment shall be maintained according to Fire Dept. Rules and Regs. arti-
cle III, section 18, until final adjudication by the relevant courts. 276 
Public Works: 
The Taxicab Commission shall report to the Senate and House Appro-
priations Committees by 1/15/89 on a plan to "issue and implement 
regulations including but not limited to the age of the vehicles, fre-
quency of inspection, and cleanliness of vehicles. "277 
272. 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-92; 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-2. 
273. 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-101 (§ 130); 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 
2269-11 (§ 130). 
274. 1988 Appropriation, 101 Stat. at 1329-102 (§ 135). 
275. 1989 Appropriation, 102 Stat. at 2269-1. 
276. Id. at 2269-3. 
277. Id. at 2269-4. 
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General Provisions: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of zoning 
regulations," the premises on squares 4302-4305 and parcels 167/64-68 
are an "eleemosynary institution" in accordance with the 12/23/86 de-
cision of the Deputy Zoning Administrator, and "the current use of the 
premises is within the non-conforming use of rights as permitted by 
[the] Certificate of Occupancy."278 
If the D.C. Council has adopted by 5/1/89 and implemented by 9/30/ 
89, a "preference system that does not preclude the hiring of noncity 
residents," no funds provided or made available may be used to pay the 
salaries or expenses to implement or enforce a residency requirement 
with respect to D.C. Government employees.279 
After this Act's date of enactment, D.C. shall not dismiss any employee 
"currently facing adverse job action for failure to comply with the resi-
dency requirement. "280 
No Federally appropriated funds shall be obligated or expended after 
12/31/88 unless by that date, D.C. has not repealed D.C. Law 6-170,' 
the Prohibition of Discrimination in the Provision of Insurance Act of 
1986, or amended the law to allow for AIDS testing as a condition for 
acquiring all health, life and disability insurance without regard to the 
face value of such policies. Eligibility for coverage and premium costs 
shall be made according to ordinary practices. 281 
No appropriated funds for the Mayor shall be expended after 1/1/89, if, 
"using existing powers, the Department of Human Services has not im-
plemented a system of mandatory reporting of individual abortions per-
formed in [D.C.]" and categories of data similar to those of the 
National Center for Health Statistics; provided that the reporting does 
not require the name of the aborting woman or the abortion provider, 
that their names remain strictly confidential, and that the "data be used 
for statistical purposes only."282 
No appropriated funds shall be obligated or expended after 12/31/88 
unless by that date, the D.C. Council has amended section 1-2520 of the 
D.C. Code by adding the following subsection: "(3) [n]otwithstanding 
any other provision of the laws of [D.C.], it shall not be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice in [D.C.] for any educational institution that is 
affiliated with a religious organization or closely associated with the ten-
278. Id. at 2269-13 (§ 140(a)). 
279. /d. (§ 141(a)). 
280. /d. (§ 141(b)). 
281. /d. (§ 143). 
282. Id. (§ 144). 
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ets of a religious organization to deny, restrict, abridge, or condition-
(A) the use of any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or (B) the granting 
of any endorsement, approval, or recognition, to any ... persons that 
are organized for, or engaged in, promoting, encouraging, or condoning 
any homosexual act, lifestyle, orientation, or belief."283 
283. Id at 2269-14 (§ 145(b)). 
